India’s strategic paralysis with China must end. It’s Time to Expose Xi’s Border Bluff

a The strategic reset against China is vital to India’s national security. The armed forces are capable of executing more aggressive tactics to enforce a status quo favorable to India. National consensus and political direction is the need of the hour.

China has not forgotten its ancient military strategist Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) wrote In his treatise, Art of War: “To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the pinnacle of skill. To subdue the enemy without a fight is the pinnacle of skill.” And faithful to his teachings, China, ever since 2013engaged in ‘Gray Zone Warfare’Emphasizing India’s conduct in international affairs and weakening it as a competitor.

The military manifestation of this strategy is to take advantage of favorable military differentials and volatile borders to embarrass India, undermine its military and political prestige, and create obstacles in its quest to become a world power. In doing so, it has strengthened its territorial claims and denied India the right to patrol 1,000 square kilometers of its territory through a preemptive offensive exercise in eastern Ladakh in April-May 2020. After securing the 1959 claim line, China’s focus shifted to the northeast. , to try The latest manifestation of this policy is to “unilaterally change the status quo” in the Yangtze sector of Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh on 9 December 2022.


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decoding India,cowering reaction

India’s military response has been passive and defensive. Apart from securing the strategically important Kailash Range On the night of 29/30 August 2020, though in its own territory, India did not take any retaliatory offensive. Fear of launching a surge to defend our territory with “riot police” actions without the use of kinetic energy weapons has effectively decimated our forces, resulting in 20 soldiers killed in action so far And hundreds have been injured. The lack of a coherent strategy based on ill-conceived political and diplomatic considerations has not yielded any strategic advantage, but has only kept our troops in harm’s way.

Our current military strategy has failed miserably to contain China, and diplomacy hasn’t fared any better. It began with an intense engagement from 2014 to 2019, which peaked under the guise of two informal summits after the 2017 Doklam crisis. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping 18 times Three times more than all the prime ministers combined. By Chinese design or by default, diplomacy has now been limited to strategic engagements by militaries. The irony is hard to miss – soldiers are acting as diplomats, and diplomats are micromanaging military conduct at the tactical level.

Domestic opinion has been blinded by obscurity, rhetoric and bombast. There has been no debate in Parliament on the status of the border. The intention seems to be to protect the prime minister’s ‘strongman’ image and his government’s ideological reputation with regard to national security, in turn protecting its own electoral prospects. The threat to our national security is from China and the government focus Pakistan is over. Neo-nationalism has added to the problem. 69.3 percent Indians have been made to believe that India will defeat China in the war. the transformation of the armed forces is in mess up Due to lack of political ownership and lack of funds. Instead of offering rational advice, the Army has toed the political line to cover up its own lapses at the borders.


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Why is China doing this?

in his semen paper, Historical Appraisal of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations, former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale writes: “China’s India policy has been shaped by its vision of the great great power strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and the United States….As a result, it has Seen as equally a competitor for security and status. It did not see India on its own merits or give it credit as an agency, but saw it as unequal and unreliable. During the Cold War, China’s objective was to keep India as neutral as possible. In the post-Cold War period, the goal evolved to limit India’s ability to harm the strategic goal of Chinese hegemony through control and coercion.

of china comprehensive national power India’s is 1.8 times. Its economy is five times that of ours and defense budget is three times that of ours. Before and during the 1962 war, China occupied all areas of strategic importance. It was amenable to an agreement on a status quo basis, i.e. according to its 1959 claim line in Ladakh and the McMahon Line in the Northeast. As long as India did not challenge China internationally and disturb the status quo on the border, peace prevailed. But as India’s quest for power unfolded, China, by now America’s top challenger, began using the shaky borders to assert its hegemony once again.

China seeks to reassert its dominance as India forms a perceived nexus with the US, makes offensive political statement Threatens the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to regain Aksai Chin and other areas, and emerge as a pole in international affairs. At the strategic level, it seeks to prevent India from developing its border infrastructure to prevent future threats.

It is pertinent to emphasize that apart from embarrassing India at the borders, China has no tangible force against it. The challenge before India is to stop China from using this advantage.


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tactical reset

China has a stated goal of becoming a major world power by 2049. To challenge it, India must have at least a $10 trillion economy and a reformed military. This should be our long term goal.

The current state of strategic paralysis with China must end. As an immediate action, India should announce its National Security Strategy (NSS), which should articulate our national interests and resolve adversaries. Fears of increasing animosity with China can be allayed by the use of subtle language, as most major powers do. The fear of the NSS imposing domestic accountability on the government makes no sense in the light of our continuing embarrassments at the Line of Actual Control since April-May 2020. The NSS will pave the way for a national defense strategy and a government-owned transformation strategy for the armed forces. forces and provide clarity for a viable military strategy. The political establishment has neither conveyed nor justified its intentions to its opponents through a formal NSS document directions for the Armed Forces.

Even more urgently, India must decide its military strategy to manage the border situation. It should unilaterally declare its Red Line on the borders (i.e. our perception of the LAC and the areas under our control). The use of words like ‘field of different perceptions’ should end. The marked maps must be handed over to China, and we must physically secure all territories. There is no sanctity to past agreements which China has repeatedly violated. Any aggressive movement across this line should be treated as hostile and dealt with by appropriate military action. Foolproof surveillance and reconnaissance must be ensured.

Below the nuclear range, military difference is irrelevant to securing borders, but political will is essential. It should be clear to the government that China’s growth mechanisms are limited, and within the scope of such growth, our armed forces will prevail – judging by our experience. But repeatedly stalling the military without a clear solution strategy, and forcing it to revert to non-military actions, neither buys India time nor creates conditions for dialogue among equals.

The above strategy would require defending the entire range. Strategically important areas should be defended by the army. The rest of the border should be monitored by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which in turn should be placed under the command of the army. Border economy, development and tourism should be linked to this deployment, as has been done by China since 2017.

We should not take the advice of our fears regarding growth. Nuclear weapons protect us from a decisive defeat and any significant loss of territory. If push comes to shove, our armed forces should be ready to fight like in Ukraine. Given Russia’s experience and our nuclear weapons prowess, China would not dare to escalate to a limited war. Even if it does, our armed forces are more than a match for him and will force a bloody stalemate, a defeat for China.

Diplomatic engagement at the strategic level should be reopened. National interests have always driven India’s foreign policy, and strategic autonomy has always been its hallmark. This should be conveyed to China in no uncertain terms. We must allay China’s apprehensions about India becoming a military ally of other powers until its actions leave us with no choice. Pragmatism demands that India seriously consider an interim settlement, if not a permanent one, on the basis of the 1959 Claim Line and the McMahon Line.

In geopolitical terms, India is facing its biggest challenge ever from China. The government should take the nation – Parliament, the opposition, the media and the public – into confidence. The time has come to answer China’s bluff on the borders. Let there be no doubt. It’s not about territory; Our national will, sovereignty and autonomy are under attack by China. The whole world is paying attention and we should not appear submissive. A strategic reset is urgently needed, failing which we are only encouraging China and the worst is yet to come.

Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM(R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. He tweets @rwac48. Thoughts are personal.

(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)