The meaning of representation in any representative democracy is necessarily a contested concept; A productive force that shapes and restructures the structure of political competition. Given our historical context, the representation of Muslims has become an even greater lightning rod for current political divisions, especially since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has risen to a position of national dominance.
Much editorial ink has been spilled over the BJP’s refusal to provide even token political representation to the Muslim minority. But an interesting aspect is the adaptation made by non-BJP opposition parties over the past decade to the political question of Muslim representation. This adaptation was partly a reaction to the BJP-dominated system; But it was also a response to long-term structural changes in Indian politics.
To chart this development, we will use the three dimensions of political representation (descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and substantive representation), developed by Hannah F. Borrowing from Pitkin’s seminal text, The Concept of Representation (1967). At its core, descriptive representation refers to the degree to which representatives resemble the people they claim to represent, such as the social/cultural identity of the representatives. Symbolic representation refers to the ways by which the representative “stands up for” the representation through speech, actions, and symbolic gestures. And, substantive representation refers to the ways in which the representative serves the interests of the represented, such as by advancing the political agenda or policy preferences of the represented.
Example of Uttar Pradesh
In Uttar Pradesh, for example, the accommodation of the significant Muslim minority (about a fifth of the state) was done by the previous Congress and Samajwadi Party (SP) regimes by providing them a mix of descriptive and symbolic representation. While descriptive representation of Muslims (such as the proportion of Muslim legislators and ministers) often lagged behind their share of the population in the era of Congress dominance, the Congress also offered symbolic representation: to safeguard a package of ‘Muslim issues'”. Stand”‘. These ‘Muslim issues’ (mostly cultural issues such as Urdu, Uniform Civil Code (UCC), Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), and later the Babri Masjid) symbolized a compact between the Congress elite and a politico-religious leadership known as was skillfully built as “a”. stand-in” for the entire community.
Later, the SP reneged on the terms of the bargain and became the preferred party of the Muslim voters. Congress), with a single party rarely capturing more than half of all Muslim votes. SP’s strategy had three components. One, there was an increase in the rhetoric given to the role of “protecting” the Muslim issues package, in contrast to the Congress, which was mired in infringing on an upper caste vote bank with an upper caste vote bank. . Second, the philanthropic-strong image of the party leader played by Mulayam Singh Yadav in UP and Lalu Prasad Yadav in neighboring Bihar as “protector of minorities” was deeply personal. And three, while the Muslim legislators were to play only a rubber-stamp role, a statewide Muslim party face was created to vent the ‘Muslim anger’ from time to time and strengthen the protectorate role of the party leader. This role was played by leaders like SP’s Azam Khan in UP and Mohammad Ashraf Fatmi of Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar.
But the major change brought about by the BJP’s dominance is that the “symbolic representation” of the SP and RJD was no longer a viable strategy to accommodate Muslims. The above three components of symbolic representation have been hollowed out in practice. For one, the SP and the RJD have been silent in their rhetorical response to the BJP’s policies relating to the cultural concerns of minorities (UCC, madrassas, AMU, Babri Masjid, etc.). Two, Akhilesh Yadav and Tejashwi Yadav have deliberately shunned the role of “protectors” of minorities. And three, Akhilesh Yadav has taken an apparently apathetic attitude towards the systematic destruction of Azam Khan’s political career by the ruling BJP, even as Tejashwi Yadav ousted Ashraf Fatmi from the RJD. The pitch that parties like the SP and the RJD (as well as the Trinamool Congress) are now giving to Muslim voters focuses on a very narrow concept of security and a vague promise of “development for all”. The only option is for the BJP. It’s worked so far. It has worked so far. According to surveys, the three parties respectively captured upwards of three-fourths of the Muslim vote (an unprecedented figure) in their previous assembly elections. But the long-term viability of this strategy also remains uncertain.
in Tamil Nadu
In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, a common element has been the centrality given to native representation in their (otherwise quite different) routes of Muslim settlement. Even though affiliated with Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) In an earlier phase of expansion, he rapidly expanded his own political sphere among Muslims, marginalizing the IUML as a result, marginally bypassing the Congress. He did this, partly by appealing to the shared Tamil heritage and participation of Muslims in the Dravidian movement, and partly by accommodating Muslims to a backward paradigm. This included the inclusion of Dalit Muslims and Christians in the existing backward reservations, as well as the expansion of a separate reservation clause for Muslims to the latter. Poor Muslims, especially those left out of the welfare net in southern Tamil Nadu, were taken in by the patriarchal pro-poor populism of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). The incidence of poverty among Muslims in rural Tamil Nadu declined from 37% in 1993 to 1% in 2011 (Kalaiyarasan).
However, the resurgence of parties like IUML and Manithaneya Makkal Katchi in the DMK alliance provides a more complex subplot. In the last election, the DMK-Congress had given five tickets to these (Muslim communist) parties, somewhat as a symbolic mark on the AIADMK, which was allied with the BJP. The DMK alliance secured 69% of Muslim voters (compared to 24% for the AIADMK), a significant increase over the margin in the previous elections. But this partial outsourcing of the task of mobilizing Muslims – in part fueled by the longstanding under-representation of Muslims in the party organization – remains a risky political maneuver.
and Kerala
In Kerala, Left parties made significant gains among Muslim voters (from 35% to 39% of Muslim votes) on the back of pro-poor welfare schemes. Left Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan Makes direct populist appeal to all communities, including Muslims (hints at personally taking over minority welfare department), even as his party attacks Congress-IUML alliance for encouraging minority communalism . But the overarching feature of Kerala’s minority housing is linked to the issue of more substantive representation.
It remains an open question whether northern India’s secular parties can integrate productive elements of the more robust southern model, promising “genuine representation” to Muslims while countering the BJP’s “onslaught” of “minority appeasement” .
Asim Ali is a political researcher and columnist