Last week, defense staff chief General Anil Chauhan made Courageous decision To tell a nation in refusal that India lost a fighter jet on the first night of the 100 -hour war. With Pakistan: “Why were they down, what mistakes were made – which are [sic.] Important, “He explained. Those errors, General Chauhan left, investigated the aggressive operation of the Indian Air Force during a 48 -hour stop, before it resumed long -range attacks.
Even if the details should be unnecessarily in cases of details, the importance of this truth cannot be eliminated.
War heat
Last week, six decades ago, All The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir called the largest political party, called citizens to join the army of Rajkars, who were preparing A guerrilla campaign To seize Kashmir from India. Government of government So -called Azad Kashmir ordered all men between 16 and 45 years of age Year To undergo military training. Local clerics called for jihad, new camps were set up to train volunteers and units. Pakistan’s Frontier Corps along with Afghanistan was taken to Pakistan -occupied Kashmir from the border.
Surprisingly, no person in India listened to the words broadcast on loudspeakers across the ceasefire line, which is now known as the Line of Control. From the end of July, nine columns of irregular and soldiers were made up of several hundred men – they were made by them way Almost no one noticed the heart of Kashmir.
Later, Indian intelligence officials will learn that guerrillas Was ordered To join the annual congregation to mark the death of Sant Sheikh Syed Abdul Qadir Jilani in Khanyar, Srinagar, scheduled for 8 August. Then, he marched with the protesters who gathered to protest against the arrest of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the former Prime Minister of Kashmir,. He was about to handle the airfield and radio stations and announce a revolutionary council. This would indicate to cross the ceasefire line for regular Pakistani forces to help Kashmiris.
There has never been any clarification, India Official war history Notes, “Such a large number of men had succeeded in slipping across Indian borders, which was so vigilantly protected.”
“Even on 2 August 1965,” it notes, “when a high-level conference was held in Srinagar to review the security system on the struggle fire line, there was no ink of adjacent guerrilla attack within 72 hours.”
First He In summer, however, the Indian Army began to experience an unusual degree of fire from across the ceasefire line. Then, on 16 May, an Indian outpost near Kargil came directly into the attack. The army then discovered that Pakistani forces had captured the peak in 13620 – so for its height, also in the legs – as well as around the Kala Pahar area.
For the first time after the 1947–1948 war, the Indian Army responded with aggressive operation, seizing a series of positions with the ridge above Peak 13620 and Kargil. However, the posts were returned to Pakistan on 30 June after assurance from the United Nations Secretary -General, General U Thent, About the security of the Kargil-Srinagar highway.
The Indian Army post in Tithwal, Uri, Mehar, Ponch and Nowshera, however, continued under the attack through the coming weeks – to reduce the patrolling with passes across the ceasefire line to the busy troops.
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Chaos of war
For the commanders of the Pakistan Army, the blindness of India would look like a gift from God. Hawk, a leading Hawk under the rule of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto prepared the schemes in consultation with Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed and the commander of the Pakistan Army. Pak Authorized KashmirMajor General Akhtar Hussain Malik. The memoir of the then Army Chief of Pakistan Army, General Mohammad Musa, vocal He was doubting By the idea, concerned that it can increase war.
For Moses’s surprise, his divisional commander continued the execution of an idea, which he shot: “Policy-makers were professional assessment and advised that they are serious military implications on a case, which due to political-grainly status and more ambition of some individuals.”
Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan Khan has suggested that this political tension Reduced operation From the beginning. “Chief [General Musa] And the head of the general staff, General Sher Bahadur, saw Gibraltar as a bastard child, from his establishment, was born from contact between the Foreign Minister [Bhutto] And General Malik, “Gul Hasan wrote in his memoirs.
From 1957 to 1965, Pakistan Air Force Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Asghar Khan has recorded that he was asked to hand over a Kashmiri speaking officer to run a radio station, which was designed to operate from Srinagar, but was actually located in Rawalpindi in Rawalpindi. Air Marshal was promised 24-hour head-up before the operation began, but the chaotic organization of the attack meant that it learned only after the incident.
Late on the afternoon of August 5, Shepherd Mohammad Deen in Gulmarg reported at the local police station that he had escaped a large number of armed Pakistanis. The trupes were sent to surround the column that infiltrated. That night there were further fire contacts in Tetwal, Kupwara and Mehar. The largest of the groups, Salhuddin Pillar, four Srinagar suburbs managed to push their way into the suburbs and exchange fire with Indian soldiers sent from Badami Baghi Cantonment.
However, the attack began to be stalls due to the attack, lack of local support and the absence of well -structured logistic backup. Major Farooq Ahmed Will remember later Indians ran ahead of the soldiers as he was hidden among the flea-infected animal herds. Hungry personnel of Kargil Pillar muted twice, while thousands of people returned home across the ceasefire line.
After its initial failure, the Indian Army began to push back – like the Haji Pir Pass, capture the major infiltration routes and, once again, peak 13620.
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Command failure
He led the leadership of Pakistan by highlighting the attempt to seize Kashmir. In late August, military historian Shooja Nawaz wrote, Field Marshal Ayub sent a missile to Bhutto, asking him to “take action that would reduce the problem of Kashmir, weaken the Indian resolution, and bring a general war to the conference table without provoking a general war.” General Gul Hasan now begged for permission to launch the Grand Slam, which is an aggressive aimed at the purpose of Akhanur and then shade, which will eventually cut the highway to Srinagar.
Even though the Indian Army had repeatedly fought such an attack since at least 1956, but Lieutenant-General Harbaksha Singh recorded In their memoirs That Pakistani aggressive stopped it completely.
In official war history notes, “and the supervisors of the United Nations warned India of an adjacent attack,” the preparations made by Pakistan could not be hidden for this emphasis. The warning was probably not taken seriously. “To make things worse, the Indian Air Force – never warned or consulted on the possibility of war in Kashmir – killing the army armor and gun position.
However, Indian commanders were saved from General Moses’s inexplicable decision to relieve their command mid-Battle General Akhtar Malik. After the collapse of Chamb, the forward push and speed for Zers was lost.
This gave India the time to launch its counter-aggressive launch on the border in Punjab. Xi Corps achieved initial success in her push towards Lahore, leading to a significant victory in the Battle of real north and Barki. However, in other major areas, in other major areas such as Dera Baba Nanak and Fazilka, a Pakistani counter-invisible camp managed to catch Karan. For its share, I soon described the official history as a “one slogan match”, pushing towards the core SIALKOT.
The Pakistan Air Force was able to destroy several aircraft on the ground in Pathankot and Kalikunda on a large scale on the Indian airbase by the Air Force on 6 September. These disadvantages forced the Indian Air Force to perform a large part of their resources to combat air patrols to protect their bases, thus to reduce their ability to support the army’s push towards Lahore.
India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire two days ago, Ayub and Bhutto made a secret journey to Beijing to seek support. Then-Premier Chow N-Li. Chow’s message was less than assured: “You should keep fighting even when you go back to the hills.” A tired and worried Ayub consulted Moses and Noor Khan and decided not to prolong the fight.
The failures of 1965 helped India’s conquest in the Bangladesh war after seven years – but the absence of an institutional culture of tireless and open inquiry meant that some mistakes were for the resurrection soon. In 1988, India proved unable to prevent large -scale infiltration across the Line of Control, opening the path of long jihad in Kashmir. Generalship failure Claimed a bitter toll on the lives of Indian soldiers in Kargil, as in 1965. And weaknesses in Indian air power Exposed in 2019 Gone, General Chauhan, the leading general to reversed, has now underlined.
The lesson can be learned through a close examination of one’s own errors or taught by the successes of enemies.
Praveen Swami is contributing the editor to Theprint. His X handle is @Praveenswami. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)