Aam Aadmi Party rally in Uttar Pradesh in 2014 photo credit: The Hindu
rise of Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is often depicted in the popular media as a victory of post-ideological politics. Such a naive assumption stems from a mistaken division of politics into an “ideological sphere” (the sphere of crack politics), and a “good governance sphere” (the sphere of total politics). Thus, we end up in a situation where we try to understand your success without reference to its important ideological underpinnings.
This is an important analytical mistake, not least because ideology can power the dynamics of both cleavage politics (the isolated mobilization of competing social groups) and collective politics (the formation of a dominant coalition spanning social groups). . The foundation of the AAP’s collective politics within a clear ideological framework is important not only for the AAP’s sharp appreciation of its own political appeal, but also for establishing its own mode of political mobilization within a larger political churn in the regional party space. .
The comparison between Arvind Kejriwal’s AAP and Naveen Patnaik’s Biju Janata Dal (BJD) is ideal because these political parties are the clearest examples of a “post cleavage” turn (rather than a “post-ideological” turn) that marked a new generation. It is a regional party. Some patterns of this post-cleavage paradigm can also be seen in the political strategies of new regional parties such as the TRS (Telangana Rashtra Samithi now Bharat Rashtra Samithi, or BRS) and the YSR Congress Party (YSRCP). Their continuing organizational turn towards a dominant farming caste (Velamas and Reddys, respectively) make them more ambiguous case studies. What is the basic ideological framework of post-partition parties like BJD and AAP? This can be answered by breaking down a conceptual framework into three distinct dimensions (ethical, distributive and prudential) and showing what separates the BJD and the AAP in each of these dimensions.
moral and distributive dimensions
Both the AAP and the BJD lean towards a certain concept of representative democracy, where elections are primarily used to ensure popular accountability of government functioning as a mechanism to ensure fair representation of group interests in the democratic process. is seen as a mechanism for To be sure, the logic of political representation did not really take root in either Odisha or Delhi, given the historical penetration of urban middle-class interests and the weak politicization of caste identity in both states. Odisha is one of the few major states where the political elite is largely cut off from the countryside, as it is between the upper castes and the professional middle classes of the coastal belt. The historical dominance of mining over agriculture in the state’s development trajectory shifted the balance of power from a rural elite to an urban elite consisting of upper caste (mostly Brahmin-dominated) bureaucrats and industrialists (Mohanty 1990). Meanwhile, the inclusion of the upwardly-mobile middle-caste Khandayat peasants in the larger karana class eliminated the possibility of any subsequent politicization of rural caste identity. Similarly, due to its history as a bureaucrat-run union territory, the caste divide in Delhi has not been as politicized as in its neighboring states, which were only granted partial statehood in 1993.
This yawning representational deficit, combined with a more intensified form of crony-capitalism in the post-liberalisation decades, has led to widespread pessimism about institutional politics in both states. Frustration over local-level bureaucratic malfeasance mixed with anger over high-profile corruption scandals. The resulting center-stage of anti-corruption discourse emphasized the need for a strong leader who could rein in corruption and prevent the leakage of public resources into the hands of a small, well-networked elite. It is worth quoting a quote from James Manor’s 2015 study on the dominance of the BJD in Odisha: “What about corruption? An oft-heard narrative in Odisha answers this: ‘A clean chief minister who is a stern Disciplinarians as well, they streamlined the system by (a) centralizing and thus depriving subordinates of the selling effect, and (b) punishing those who were caught profiteering”.
In his 1965 study of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh, Paul Brass praised the “integrated work” of traditional Congress factionalism. Brass wrote, “Faction struggle also broadens the basis of participation within the party as each faction competes for wider group support…by attracting new caste and religious groups.” Yet, Congress factions in Odisha (a state where Dalits and Adivasis make up about 40% of the population) not only remained isolated, as explained by political scientist Ramasray Roy (1998), but also became a hotbed for tickets and loot. also joined in the chaotic melee. Of strength Such factionalism further strengthened the perception of a corrupt, blameless regime.
In contrast, the BJD under Mr. Patnaik deliberately kept the party organization weak. The collective populism of parties like the BJD and the AAP is well aware of the inevitable conflicts between caste/community or interest-based groups, which affect party organisations. Instead, they seek to build an “umbrella coalition” from above through their broad-based, programmatic welfare-oriented leadership. For example, the BJD’s patronage strategy included buying off the local elite and cultivating the Odia media without allowing an independent center of power to emerge in the organisation. Meanwhile, the high-rent economy of both states is implemented through centralized bureaucratic mechanisms in the making of some major welfare schemes, or some grand infrastructure projects. Moreover, these universal schemes are specifically linked to the persona of an ‘honest’ chief minister, helping both parties develop a powerful programmatic appeal that extends across communities.
logical dimension
The collective emphasis of these post-crackdown parties also extends to the expression of a broad-based regional identity in which everyone can join their circle. A rigid linguistic identity, even in a relatively less heterogeneous state, can exclude large groups of people. One can recall the uneasy relations between the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Dalits or the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) with tribal groups such as the Bodos and Mishings.
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In states that are more diverse socially and geographically, such as Odisha and Delhi, a political strategy focused on narrowly defined regional identities is fraught with even greater risk. While the BJD’s Odisha model emphasizes social harmony more than progressivism/secularism, Chief Minister Patnaik has time and again reiterated the need for an inclusive Odia identity for the progress of the state. The association of social struggle with an ‘anti-development agenda’ has helped the party keep right-wing forces at bay. The BJD has made frequent inroads into Dalit and tribal groups since the 2008 Kandhamal riots, when it broke its alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Meanwhile, the BJP has failed to find a coherent Hindutva narrative. The Oriya ethnic landscape is complex: for example, the violence in Kandhamal can be seen as both “Hindu versus Christian” as well as “tribal versus Dalit” violence. Overlapping social identities do not easily lend themselves to a comprehensive developmental model – the ‘Delhi model’ or the ‘Odisha model’ – as a communal grand narrative, where aspiration replaces identity.
To be sure, this combination of a strong chief minister/centralised administration and a weak party machinery is not a special feature for either of these parties. Nevertheless, the ideological underpinnings that AAP and BJD have given to their politics make them good examples of post-crackdown change in Indian state politics.
Asim Ali is a political researcher and columnist