A legacy relationship with Russia, borders

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s short visit to New Delhi and the inaugural 2+2 meeting between India and Russia – India’s fourth such partnership with any other country – will help improve Moscow-New Delhi ties Currently under pressure from a major global power. Shift. In this environment of geopolitical uncertainty, the most important of all the diplomatic balancing work that India has to do is with Russia. And yet, don’t let the flurry of activities between Moscow and New Delhi blind us to global forces that will pose formidable challenges to the partnership.

there are obstacles

No doubt Russia is a friend of India; But Moscow’s friendship has limits. Not only do the realities of a global balance of power reduce the strength of ties over time, but more importantly, an inherited relationship based on limited interactions may eventually lose warmth, as there is so little organic, people-to-people Materials for a relationship.

Simply put, unless the bilateral relationship goes beyond arms sales/purchase, the phase of stagnation in India-Russia relations will soon begin. For example, India-Russia bilateral trade is about US$10 billion, more than India’s trade with China and the United States, China’s trade with the US and Russia, and even US trade with Russia. is less. The cultural and people-to-people contacts of the Soviet era have almost completely disappeared. Only the sale of arms will not make any relation.

Today, India-Russia relations are heavily strained by wider geopolitical realities over which neither of them fully control. The quadrilateral dynamics between India, China, the US and Russia has different implications to varying degrees for all four states in this regard, particularly for India.

dynamics

Let us use the concept of primary and secondary antagonists to better understand the dynamics of this quad. To a large extent, if not wholly, the dynamics of this six-way relationship is, on top of that, a function of the US-China rivalry. In this six-sided matrix, the Sino-US opposition is a first-order relationship and the US-Russia, China-Russia and Russia-India relationship is a second-order relationship. While the second-order relationships in this quad are, to a large extent, a product of the primary opposition, the second-order relationships also have their own unique dynamics and implications.

For example, India-China, a second-order relationship in this quad, is the result of the primary conflict between the US and China, as well as regional geopolitical rivalry between India and China.

Even though China remains its primary adversary, Washington has not yet succeeded in separating its less challenging second-order opposition (the rivalry with Moscow) from it. Washington’s parallel rivalry with China and Russia (albeit to a lesser extent) complicates matters for New Delhi.

What seems almost certain in the medium to long term is that the dynamics of the quadrilateral relationship, particularly India’s strained ties with China, will complicate India’s time-tested partnership with Russia, a process that has already begun. It’s over.

Even though Beijing has not aggressively attempted to damage India-Russia ties, there is little doubt that China will try to create a distinction between New Delhi and Moscow as India is separated from the larger Asian region. The isolation is in line with Beijing’s bigger game plan.

some scenarios

It gets more complicated if we examine the various possible scenarios in this quadrilateral relationship. For example, the extent of Chinese aggression towards India will play a role in determining India’s relationship with Russia. Consider this. An aggressive China will push India to the US, and even though Russia may be understanding India’s logic behind such pro-US leanings in the medium term, India’s relations with the US will always be a hindrance to India-Russia relations in the long run. will generate , Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s warning to India should be read in this context: “Under the slogan of the so-called Indo-Pacific Strategies and Builds, we have expressed our appreciation to our Indian friends on US activity there (the Asia-Pacific region). Expressed serious concern. Of closed block-type structures “.

In other words, the more aggressive Beijing moves towards New Delhi, the closer India will be to Washington and Moscow. However, while Moscow would appreciate a closer partnership with New Delhi, it may not when it comes to the growing India-US partnership. Furthermore, if Moscow had to choose between Beijing and New Delhi, it would choose Beijing, just as New Delhi would choose Washington over Moscow.

It also means that an aggressive China could also help in boosting India-Russia relations in the short to medium term, something we are already seeing. Recall, among other things, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow in June 2020, soon after the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control over the purchase of more weapon systems.

Meanwhile, the first-order conflict (US vs China) appears to provide room for geopolitical defenses in the second-order partnership/opposition, i.e., India-Russia and even Russia-US examples. For example, Russia’s passive concerns about China’s growing influence within its traditional periphery, and Moscow’s relations with India in the wider context of Central and West Asia and the western Indian Ocean, limit Moscow, despite geopolitical defenses to some extent. can motivate you to keep up. face to face Beijing. India’s desire for a stronger relationship with Russia will be more appreciated by the US because of China’s aggression against India and America’s systemic and first-class rivalry with Beijing. Furthermore, once the reality of China’s rise becomes a concern for Moscow, it could potentially initiate talks with Washington to strike a balance. face to face Beijing which suits Indian interests.

At the same time, however, if there are relations between the US and Russia or there is a lack of war of speech between the US and China, it may or may not have a direct and real impact on Sino-India relations since the tensions. Sino-India relations are not only a product of the global balance of power, but more fundamentally, the result of India-China dynamics in the South Asian region. In other words, whatever the state of global geopolitics, the essential (adverse) nature of India-China relations is unlikely to fundamentally change. The main enemy for New Delhi is China. Therefore, New Delhi must leverage strategies and partnerships that can help China address the challenge more effectively. This means that India will have to carefully balance its growing partnership with the US with its somewhat fragile relationship with Russia.

possibility of cooperation

Let us return to India-Russia relations and examine the possibilities of cooperation between the two sides. In a sense, the US withdrawal from Kabul and India’s ties with Moscow have helped New Delhi adopt a more flexible strategy in Afghanistan as well as the wider region. Given New Delhi’s close ties with Washington, the US presence in Kabul limited India’s options as New Delhi was widely encouraged to follow US policy in the region. With the Americans gone, India can openly cooperate with Moscow and even Tehran, especially if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) renegotiations are successful, and with their help Afghanistan and Tehran. The Central Asian region is included.

If New Delhi plays its cards well, it could use Moscow to gain greater geopolitical height in the region – while the US provided New Delhi. remain so In this area, Moscow can provide more direct opportunities to India. Of course, New Delhi will need to be prepared for an adverse reaction from Beijing and Islamabad.

Another area of ​​cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi is the Indian Ocean region, particularly the western Indian Ocean where Russia is expanding its influence and India has significant interests.

For New Delhi, which is located in an unstable and virtually friendless neighbourhood, friendship with Russia is important, despite the structural limitations of such friendship. Therefore, it will take a lot of diplomatic agility from New Delhi to stay on course in the midst of high-stakes geopolitical rivalry and improve relations with Moscow.

Happyman Jacob teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research