A step that ends the right to vote

This claim that the base-voter ID linkage is voluntary, suspicious. Currently, Form 6B provides a meaningful opt-out-the personnel should either submit their Aadhaar number or declare that they do not have one, even forced reluctance to share it in compliance. File | Photo Credit: Hindu

TeaHe pushed a fresh push to link Aadhaar with the voter ID of the Election Commission of India (ECI). It is being justified as a measure to clean the electoral rolls, eliminate fake voters and improve electoral integrity. Nevertheless, experiences and data suggest that the base linkage has led to far -reaching violations over fundamental rights over large -scale dissatisfaction, systemic errors, exclusion, arbitrary welfare disintegration, and fundamental rights of citizens.

Suspected claims

This claim that the base-voter ID linkage is voluntary, suspicious. Currently, Form 6B provides a meaningful opt-out-the personnel should either submit their Aadhaar number or declare that they do not have one, even forced reluctance to share it in compliance. Unexpectedly, by September 2023, more than 66 crore Aadhaar numbers had already been seeded. This was not only enabled by a forced legal structure, but also by data-sharing practices of suspected validity and constitutional, moral justification. These include the use of DBT seeding data viewer, which allows third party access to non-biometric identity data conducted by UIDAI as well as data collected for the National Population Register and third party for unrelated administrative purposes by other government departments.

The latest proposal of ECI fails to improve this situation. Conversely, it makes the process more restricted by the need of citizen-voters that do not provide the basis to an election registration officer to be physically present in front of an election registration officer to justify their decision. In 2023, in Yes. Niranjan vs Election CommissionThe ECI assured the Supreme Court that the Aadhaar-Voter ID Linkeage is not mandatory and appropriate clarifications would be presented for that purpose; Its latest proposal backs back on this commitment.

The new proposal also eradicates the commitment to universal and uniform franchise by implementing obstacles to those reluctant people or is unable to present the base. It puts an inconsistent burden on the elderly, disabled persons, migrant workers and individuals in remote areas, for which attending a person’s hearing before the Election Registration Officer is often neither practical nor appropriate. It not only compromises individual dignity, but also reduces the belief that is fundamental for democratic participation.

A clear, accessible and timely deficiency of the appellate mechanisms for a civil-voter has increased the problem more, if their justification for not presenting the base has been arbitrarily rejected. Supreme Court, Lal Babu Hussain and other V. Electoral registration officer (1995), unevenly believed that any decision to remove a name from the electoral roll should follow the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The Central Government and the ECI argue that the Aadhaar ID linkage will eliminate duplicate voters and electoral fraud. However, this claim does not face investigation. Aadhaar was never designed to serve as evidence of citizenship. Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 clearly states that Aadhaar is a residence-based identity system, which means that Aadhaar holder is not necessarily an Indian citizen. Many High Courts have ruled that Aadhaar is not a proof of Indian citizenship. UIDAI itself has confirmed that non-citizens living in India for 182 days are also eligible for Aadhaar. Importantly, in the Supreme Court Justice KS Putaswamy (Rit.) V. Union of india ,

By connecting the base with voter ID, ECI is creating a mechanism that introduces an incredible filter in the electoral process, risking large-scale dissolution of civil-voters, and erases the sanctity of universal franchise and democratic participation guaranteed by the Constitution. These threats are not imaginary; They have been documented. In 2015, ECI attempted a uniform Aadhaar-Voter ID linkage under the National Election Roll Recordion and Certification Program. As a result, in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, 55 million voters alone were arbitrarily removed from the electoral rolls due to respect mismatched. Voters disappeared their name only when they reached polling stations on election day. The ECI was forced to quit exercise after the Supreme Court stayed through an order of August 11, 2015.

Aadhaar-Voter ID Linkease also produces a serious risk of dragnet monitoring and voter profiles. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 includes extensive exemption for government institutions, increasing the possibility that voter data can be accessed and exploited for political purposes. Once the Adar is attached to the voter ID, it becomes possible to cross the electoral data along with the other database, allowing the ruling parties to monitor the voter demographics. The implications are related. Political actors can use this data for subtle target voters, suppress opposition strongholds, or even manipulating electoral rolls to achieve predetermined electoral results.

The base seed with electoral roll data affects the main principles of constitutional design. The ECI, contained with the powers of “Superintending, Direction and Control” in the elections, is a constitutionally independent authority. In contrast, UIDAI is a statutory body functioning under executive control – which is bound by government instructions under Section 50 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and is subject to Section 48. It reduces the separation of powers entrusted with electoral data, endanizing the integrity of the electoral process and the democratic ideal of independent and fair elections.

Another defect lies in the underlying incredibility of the base database. The 2022 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Performance Audit Report number 24 2021 was identified with major deficiencies, including cancellation of more than 4.75 lakh Aadhaar numbers due to their repetition and issuance based on faulty biometric data. The CAG also did not get any assurance that all base holders qualify as ‘residents’ under the Aadhaar Act, as UIDAI did not determine any specific evidence, documents or procedure to verify the duration of the applicant’s residence in India. Relying on such an error-prone database to de-duplicate the electoral rolls will incorrectly delete and exclude.

Election verification methods

Instead of a technical improvement and violation of the right to privacy of citizens, the ECI should focus on strengthening the traditional, time-tested methods of voter verification. Regular door-to-door verification by booth level officials; Extensive, independent audit of electoral rolls; And functional public grievance redressal structures are more effective and constitutionally sound approaches to address concerns about alleged duplicate or fraud entries. Introducing independent inspection through social audit will further increase accountability and stop the politically motivated manipulation of the electoral rolls.

The right to vote is a constitutional guarantee. Any policy that puts an inappropriate burden on civic-voters, introduces the incredible verification system, or enables political outline, should be abandoned. Aadhaar-Voter ID linkage is all three. Such a constitutionally horrific scheme has gained support in political spectrum.

John Simte, Lawyer and Legal Researchers