Beijing’s move, India’s turn

Looking at New Delhi’s long list of diplomats, officials and ministers from around the world over the past few weeks, one can assume that India was playing an active role in resolving the crisis in Europe. Despite his ambitions to be revered as a global statesman, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has conscientiously avoided his handling of the crisis. India has refused to condemn Russia’s military offensive, continues to do business with Russia, and has refrained from voting on UN resolutions.

a sure sign

India is the centerpiece of the Joe Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Indian Foreign and Defense Ministers recently held a ‘2+2’ meeting with their US counterparts. The Japanese Prime Minister was in New Delhi last month. The Australian Prime Minister held a virtual summit with Mr Modi a few days before the two countries signed an interim trade agreement. Then he had to make it clear that he had not betrayed Ukraine by signing the agreement with India.

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Even as India’s quad partners (US, Japan, Australia) imposed trade sanctions on Russia, denounced Russian President Vladimir Putin and provided military aid to Ukraine, India recently visited the Russian Foreign Office in New Delhi. Minister welcomed. The sign was unmistakable: he was the only foreign official among many in New Delhi to hold a personal meeting with Mr. Modi.

A change can be seen nonetheless: India has chosen to increase, rather than reduce, the supply of crude it offered from Russia, which is being offered at a discount. Despite warnings by US Deputy National Security Adviser Dalip Singh in New Delhi that “there will be consequences for countries that actively attempt to circumvent or withdraw sanctions,” India and Russia continue to engage in bilateral trade bypassing dollar-based Looking for ways. financial system.

India’s quad partners have so far been exceptionally sympathetic to New Delhi’s case, but the underlying tensions in their relations with India will surface as the crisis escalates. These tensions have been noted in Beijing, which has praised India for pursuing an independent foreign policy. In recent years, Chinese officials had viewed Indian moves in the region through the prism of their US policy, but India’s stance on Ukraine has prompted a rethink in Beijing. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi in March was motivated either by the need to steer India away from the Quad or as an exploratory step towards a major strategic reset with New Delhi.

It would be wrong to focus on the minimum result of a journey to be considered a failure. The visit itself is a major success, considering that around 90,000 soldiers from both armies have been stationed in Ladakh for nearly two years, after Chinese troops captured some areas that were hitherto under Indian control. Despite 15 rounds of talks between senior military commanders, China continues to occupy at least three such areas. From other such areas, both the armies have diverged, that is, moved their troops back a couple of miles, but there has been no reduction, that is, they have not moved the troops to their bases.

In his meetings with Mr. Wang, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar did not seek restoration of status quo in Ladakh as of April 2020; Liberation from the remaining “friction points” was the only precondition for a return to normalcy in Sino-India relations. In a hurry to announce a resolution to the crisis, India only made further concessions to China by seeking disengagement from Patrolling Point 15, suggesting that the other two regions – Depsang and Demchok – are “legacy issues”. This is in line with Mr Modi’s stand since June 2020, when he first denied Chinese occupation of Indian territory in Ladakh and has remained silent on the matter since then. Questions on the border crisis have been denied in Parliament. There has been no official media briefing in two years. Thus the government has successfully hidden the truth of Chinese entry from the Indian public.

Mr Modi’s desire to reduce Chinese hostility was confirmed by former US Ambassador to India Kenneth Juster, when he said that the Indian government had instructed US officials not to mention Chinese aggression in any joint statement. Just take it strong. , While New Delhi is being described as being too liberal towards Beijing, China is indifferent to Indian sensibilities. Before coming to New Delhi, Mr. Wang signed a provocative statement on Kashmir with foreign ministers of Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries in Islamabad and emphasized China’s strong ties with Pakistan. While it has allowed South Korean and Pakistani students to return to China, Beijing has not extended the same courtesy to more than 23,000 Indian students. If China is joining hands with India, then it is on its own terms.

Despite the border crisis, India’s trade with China reached a record high of $125 billion in 2021. India remains the largest recipient of loans disbursed by the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. The Modi government did not criticize China’s clout in Hong Kong and never raised the issue of mistreatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang, although it may have been motivated by defensiveness about criticism of its strong policies in Kashmir. The activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan community in India are calibrated to remain within limits that do not provoke Beijing.

changing relationships

China is the glue that binds the quads together. While Indian and US policies differ in countries such as Myanmar, Iran and Afghanistan, China is the only interest that binds the two countries together. The basic premise of a cooperative partnership with India will be tested by these recent moves from Beijing to New Delhi. Questions have always been raised in whispered voices in Washington about the relative power gap between the two Asian powers (China’s economy is nearly six times the size of India’s). Despite this, it has been an article of confidence in Washington over the years that after facing a Chinese military offensive in 2020, India realized it needed the US to counter the threat from Beijing. This was the thrust of Mr. Singh’s scathing advice in New Delhi.

During Mr. Wang’s visit, China offered to build a virtual G-2 in Asia by defending India’s traditional role and cooperating on development projects in South Asia as ‘China-India Plus’. Once India’s limited preconditions for declaring a resolution to the border crisis are met, the proposal will appear more attractive and genuine than it is today. When Mr. Modi, as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, was denied a visa to travel to the US because of his links to the 2002 Gujarat riots, he made regular visits to China. His comfort level with Beijing is deeper than any strategic restructuring caused by the current geopolitical churn. If this moment provides for the re-establishment of India’s ties with China, it will alter New Delhi’s ties with the US and raise questions about the effectiveness of the Quad.

While the Biden administration continues to harp on “shared values” with the Modi government, the truth is that New Delhi’s commitment to democratic values, basic freedoms, constitutional rights and treatment of religious minorities has been alarmingly poor. Critics of Mr Modi allege that his idea of ​​democracy is closer to that of Donald Trump, Viktor Orban and Mr Putin than the current US administration.

Read also | Peace in the border areas the key to normal relations, India told China

The Ukraine crisis has brought already misunderstandings into a sharp contrast. The geopolitical churn has put the choices made by Mr. Modi as Prime Minister in harsh glare. New Delhi’s decisions have not gone down well with the US as India is under more pressure, the results could spell another surprise for Washington.

Sushant Singh is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Research