Brazil cordoned off democracy on the ropes

The election of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 was sparked by a mobilization of right-wing groups demanding economic liberalization and widespread separation from the country’s traditional political parties and their old corruption scandals. During the election campaign, Bolsonaro built his political base by tapping into these two sources of support, while also taking advantage of the support of a key bureaucracy that largely kept its nose out of politics: the military.

But Bolsonaro’s two campaign commitments – liberalizing the economy and fighting corruption – proved to be empty. In 2020, Sergio Moro, the star judge responsible for jailing former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on corruption charges ahead of the 2018 election, resigned as Bolsonaro’s minister of justice. Moro was the key person who gave credence to Bolsonaro’s anti-corruption stance. Since his departure, corruption scandals have surrounded members of Bolsonaro’s own family, and Brazil’s famous “car wash” anti-corruption task force has been disbanded.

After presenting himself as an “outsider” (despite serving as federal legislator for 28 years), Bolsonaro promised that he would not make any concessions to smaller political parties in exchange for support. Nevertheless, he has become dependent on these parties, even negotiating aggressively for financial resources to ensure his survival.

In alliance with Arthur Lira, president of the Chamber of Deputies, Bolsonaro has been able to face 139 separate requests for impeachment from more than 1,550 individuals and 550 organizations. (By comparison, the National Congress received 68 such requests regarding President Dilma Rousseff between 2011 and 2016, and she was actually impeached and removed from office.)

In the end, Bolsonaro has not followed through on his promise to liberalize the economy. When he came into office, he had a neoliberal platform prepared by his economy minister, Paulo Guedes. Known as the “boy of Chicago” because he studied with free marketers at the University of Chicago, Guedes was expected to follow the model of economic programs of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in the 1970s and 1980s. But now, both Bolsonaro and Geddes are up for it. Abandon your previous commitment to liberalization to improve your chances for re-election in 2022.

Among other things, the administration is pushing for a massive expansion to the Bolsa Familia (now relabeled Auxilio Brasil), a conditional cash-transfer program originally established in 2003 by the Lula Workers’ Party. This is understandable: as of September 2021, annual inflation was running at over 10% with rising prices of petrol, food and electricity severely affecting less-advantaged social groups. To guarantee resources for Auxilio Brasil, however, Guedes plays a dangerous card, indicating that he is prepared to eliminate the constitutional spending limit.

Established under former President Michel Temer, this medium-term fiscal rule stabilizes real (inflation-adjusted) primary spending at its 2016 levels, limiting federal government growth. The Brazilian market duly sank after Guedes announced his intention.

But perhaps the feature of Bolsonaro’s tenure as president that deserves most attention is the presence of high-ranking military officials within his administration. As Brazilian Army Reserve Colonel Marcelo Pimentel points out, Bolsonaro has not needed to belong to any political party since 2019 because he already has the backing of a de facto “military party”. This arrangement represents a dangerous politicization of the armed forces, with serious implications. for the political system.

The sovereign debt crisis, fiscal mismanagement and hyperinflation of the 1980s seriously tarnished the image of the Brazilian armed forces, and should have put an end to their political aspirations. But Bolsonaro has given some generals another taste of power. His vice president, Hamilton Mourao, is a retired general. In 2018, there were 2,765 active and retired military officers holding civilian positions in the federal government; By 2020, this figure had increased to 6,157. The Brazilian government now has proportionally more military officers serving as ministers than Venezuela. Military personnel also lead about one-third of publicly owned companies, where they receive high salaries.

After reclaiming the levers of state power, the armed forces will also bear the brunt of the blame for the country’s disastrous Covid-19 response. While the official death toll has passed 600,000, the actual number is certainly much higher. In October 2021, an investigation by Brazil’s Senate accused the Bolsonaro administration of crimes against humanity for its misguided pandemic policies.

From June 2020 to March 2021, the health ministry was led by three-star General Eduardo Pazuello of the military, who proved unable to negotiate a vaccine purchase with Pfizer. This set the stage for an aggressive second wave of infections, during which Pazuelo demonstrated a still greater inability to elicit a coordinated national response. He has even been the subject of a criminal investigation for his inaction leading to the collapse of a health system in the Amazon capital, Manaus, where Covid-19 patients died from a lack of medical oxygen.

Pazuelo is hardly alone. Throughout Bolsonaro’s administration, military officers have been awarded positions for which they lacked the necessary knowledge or expertise. The traditional training and professional experience of a general, whether in war or in peace, does not translate into the management of public services, especially in Brazil. While the military maintains a rigid hierarchy, Brazil’s technical civil service provides more initiative and autonomy to employees than in many countries. While military officers do not dare to question the decisions of their superiors, open deliberation is central to democracy and a key attribute of efficient public administration.

The 2022 presidential election will be a defining moment for Brazil. It remains to be seen whether Bolsonaro’s opponents will be able to garner support for an alternative.

But one thing is clear: a second mandate for Bolsonaro and his military sponsors would pose a serious threat to Brazilian society and its democratic institutions. Although there will be no return to the era of military coups, that is only because the military is already in power – and it has every intention of staying so. ©2021/Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org)

Camilla Willard Duran is Professor of Law at the University of So Paulo.