For China President, Xi Jinping’s three-country tour of Southeast Asia (14-18 April 2025), for Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia, was a target: Pitching Beijing as the only reliable partner of choice. Facing 145% tariffs on Chinese exports imposed by the Trump administration, China is actively re -presenting its external economic engagement, especially in geographical areas where it enjoys strategic proximity and relatively receptive partners.
This South East Asia Outreach is not just regular diplomacy. This is a step to reduce external economic pressure, project stability by Beijing and cement its leadership in Indo-Pacific. The yatra also comes in view of “Central Conference on Work related to neighboring countries” (April 8-9). This relatively rare workshop was attended by senior party leaders and underlined the importance of promoting “a community with shared future” with neighboring states.
As a buffer and bridge
China is eager to insulating itself with the influence of an intensive trade war with the US, which is now spread to export control, technology restriction and financial decupping beyond tariffs. In this context, South East Asia acts as a buffer and a bridge. It offers China flexible business channels, manufacturing options, and diplomatic partners collectively to push back against the story of de-digging or control led by Washington.
Under US President Donald Trump, Cambodia can withstand a combined tariff of up to 59% (including 10% universal tariff and 49% additional once after a 90-day stagnation), while Vietnam and Malaysia will be hit with 46% and 24% tariffs respectively. In contrast, Mr. Xi’s message was that China is open to business, supports multilateralism, and unilaterally opposed for force – a direct refutation to American policies. In Vietnam, 45 cooperation agreements were signed in his meeting with prominent Vietnamese leaders. In Malaysia, the discussion focused on increasing economic cooperation and addressing regional security concerns. The two countries signed more than 30 agreements, including areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, agriculture and infrastructure development. The trip to Cambodia (first of Mr. Xi after 2016), underlined China’s role as Cambodia’s largest investor and business partner, with bilateral trade in 2024 more than $ 15 billion. All these agreements, especially in Cambodia, the Funn Teco Canal Project, is an attempt to show that China provides public goods and economic opportunities, while the US Pivots.
To project a contrast
Beyond economics, this journey was also about ideological and ideal competition because Beijing attempts to draw a contrast among its models of non-intervention and economic engagement, and depicts it as American intervention and ideological rigidity. The story especially resonated in Cambodia, which has long been a close political ally of Beijing, and to some extent in Malaysia, where the government has sought to maintain a balanced foreign policy among most major powers.
Mr. Xi’s call to carry forward a code of conduct in the South China Sea, support for the development of infrastructure through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and are part of this soft power strategy to emphasize cultural linkage. It offers China not only as a neighbor, but also as an ideal leader in regional order construction, an alternative vision for the US-led Liberal International Order.
The time of this journey is politically important. American engagement with South East Asia has been episodic and is often considered reactive, on the contrary Washington despite measures. The US Indo-Pacific strategy is also often seen in some parts of the Association (ASEAN) of the South-East Asian nations, as security focuses on competing with China heavy and narrowly. The journey of Mr. Xi, by contrast, provides tangible delivarbles: infrastructure projects, digital cooperation, business facility and safety dialogue.
He also played at the Intra-Assyon Dynamics by visiting the major ASEAN members. For example, attempts to deepen the relationship with Vietnam, traditionally careful with Chinese vigor in the South China Sea, is an attempt to assure Hanoi. In Malaysia, China’s emphasis on peaceful controversy resolution and BRI cooperation appeals to a government that is cautious about becoming a pawn in the US-China rivalry. While Washington continues to emphasize safety participation – through Aukas (Australia, United Kingdom, US), quad (Australia, India, Japan, America), and bilateral alliances – China is doubled on economic diplomacy, where the US is considered underdivated. Unlike China’s clear proposals of investment and trade, initiatives such as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework have been criticized for prosperity for lack of market access promotion.
Big picture
In addition, Beijing’s ability to introduce itself as an unavoidable economic partner can complicate American efforts to form an alliance to financially isolate or prevent China. If South East Asia moves rapidly towards economic intelligence with China, Washington will be difficult to operate a strong economic counter-strateg. Mr. Xi’s South-East Asia is a forward-looking strategy to increase the Chinese influence in Indo-Pacific at the time of the systemic flux. In the competition between the US and China for regional priority, the calculation of such diplomacy is calculated a strategic status, with long-term implications for regional alignment, economic integration and regulation.
Finally, the tour is also about the domestic political signal. For Mr. Xi, it is important to show the ability to show that China is not internationally isolated, despite the growing Western pressure. Warm welcome, optics of economic deals and strategic dialogues work to incite their authority at home and compensate for negative headlines around economic recession or diplomatic friction with the West. At the same time, they indicate the region – and largely global south – that China continues to bow to them there. Despite Beijing’s unilateral tendency, how receptive will be south -east for Shri Xi’s outreach, it remains to be seen.
Harsh v. Pant is the Vice President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Pratikashree Basu is an associate fellow-Indo-Pacific in Observer Research Foundation
Published – May 02, 2025 12:08 am IST