IAfter N Operation Sindoor, India has started a multi-dimensional diplomatic initiative by sending seven all-party delegations to several foreign capitals. This outreach can be described as the best post-facto diplomatic push, with the aim of clarifying India’s position on India’s position on across the border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and to justify its military response through Operation Sindoor. The delegation features several MPs, especially Shashi Tharoor, who has emerged as an integrated politician capable of reducing biased partition during the national crisis moments.
Countries selected for outreach are a mixture of important strategic and business partners, as well as the current or supporting member of the United Nations Security Council-where Pakistan currently holds a non-installed seat. These parliamentary delegations are also being supported by a cadre of experienced retired diplomats.
However, there is no clear benchmark to assess what these delegations expect to receive the idols. Nevertheless, their formation indicates a clear effort to combat India’s growing strategic separation, as stress Pahgam was at the peak to indicate its difficult currency on terrorism after the terrorist attack and later military growth of India.
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Strategic matrix of discomfort
In the current strategic landscape, India finds itself in a rapid complex position, marked by many disconnecting developments.
First, despite India’s growing height and influence in global affairs, the Pahalgam served as a clear reminder of the boundaries of that effect after the attack. Not a single major power agreed to connect the attack with Pakistan, even China and Turkey increased unequal diplomat and military support in Islamabad. However, more disturbing, India had inability to convince the International Monetary Fund to delay $ 1 billion bailout package for Pakistan – while India was engaged in Operation Sindoor. Such decisions were damaging optics: A country fighting the subclass of terrorism, who watched the same state, receives a major financial vengeance from an international institution. This not only reduced the story of India, but also strengthened a truth – this is, and possibly a solitary battle for India.
Second, while the decades of India’s “Dojier Diplomacy” has been a long-term strategy to chip on Pakistan’s global credibility-the decades of “dosier diplomacy”. The current polynomial parliamentary delegation continues in this tradition, trying to “explain” the behavior of Pakistan to the world. Perhaps this task should now be less about proving Pakistan’s faulty – which is well known – and it is more about telling how it misuses international support and financial bailouts to maintain its unstable activities.
Third, in the global strategic discourse, India and Pakistan have a more subtle but serious but serious challenge. This threat is not in the formal policy documents but not in the narratives – especially by US President Donald Trump, like those who publicly claimed a credit to broke the “ceasefire” between India and Pakistan. His comments described a serious national security situation as a bilateral squall as the need for external arbitration. India dismissed such characters unevenly, yet the perception was damaged. Such comments were made to India’s most important strategic partner, making them more problematic. Many people in India’s diplomatic and strategic circles recognize the need to navigate the Trump era with minimal asset damage, as their unpredictable style can often stain the lines between strategic partnership and protesting diplomacy that lies in strategic drugs.
Fourth, India’s reaction to the widespread impact of China’s factor is self-proclaimed compared to the purpose. This point will also be detailed later, but a quick run alone through recent diplomatic activities in the last week will help outline this contrast that is reinforced by mistake lines in the subcontinent today. They portray an underlying imbalance that faces India, when this principle is trying to combat it in the lack of clarity.
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Competition of optics, construction of stories
With the deployment of the polynomial delegation to explain about the post -Cyndor of India’s position, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar began his first foreign trip after the operation. His chosen destinations were Germany, Denmark and Netherlands -3 major European nations. The journey took place a few days later when he publicly criticized the comments of the European Union’s high representative, which was urged for de-escation, dismissed as “preaching”.
In contrast, the first foreign journey by a senior Pakistani officer after Operation Sindoor was made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan, made by his long -term strategic partner, China. This Juxtaposition throws light on the diplomatic routes taken by the two countries after the increased tension by the two countries.
Therefore, India’s response, not only for the purpose of combating stories, but also combines diplomatic optics – simultaneously by confusing several strategic theaters. He said, Pakistan first goes to the unavoidable partner.
Let’s find out these efforts one by one.
While Germany and Denmark are already part of the countries being seen by the Consonance delegation of India, the Netherlands stands out as the sole exception-although it remains an important partner for India within the European Union. Germany, now under the leadership of Chancellor Frederick Merz, is undergoing an important political and military overhaul, with formal commitments to change its national and European Union’s defense currency. As India’s largest trading partner in Europe, Germany also has great impact in Brussels, where India is currently advancing negotiations for the “starting crop” free trade agreement with the European Union.
India’s second largest trading partner in Europe has been rapidly formed with India in the role of artificial intelligence in semiconductor and military applications such as high -tech areas. Meanwhile, another important European Union players provide significant cooperation ability in Denmark, green technology and sustainable investment.
Foreign Minister’s choice to join with these three European countries – despite parallel outreach by parliamentary delegations – reveals a sound strategy to deepen bilateral relations in the areas of economic, technical and defense cooperation. But these outreach decreases with the compete with China on the strategic choke points of India.
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India’s Afghanistan problem
Although the Indian media mentioned the absence of a grand reception for the Pakistani PM in Beijing, the issue of more pressure lies in the engagement of China-Pakistan related to Afghanistan. A joint statement of his tripartite structure indicates that the Taliban-led Afghan government is ready to integrate Gwadar in its connectivity plans under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
This development runs a counter for India’s efforts, aims to reduce the dependence of Afghanistan on the Karachi port of Pakistan by promoting connectivity through Chabahar-a port in which India has invested enough as part of its India-Afghanistan-Iran tripartial cooperation. Strategic arguments have been made to maintain influence in Afghanistan, factors such as Pashtun Nationalism and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) take advantage of the presence of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups, which are historically in relation to Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Meanwhile, China has moved more outspokenly in Afghanistan since 2021, beating India through dollars, high-level trillions of trillions of trillions, and focus on management of extremist groups such as Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan province (ISKP).
Maintaining and expanding strategic depths in Afghanistan is important for China’s broader connectivity ambitions through Gwadar. Beijing is also playing the role of an intermediary, ensuring that TTP and Pashtun nationalism does not grow tension on a tension on a full -scale war between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both Kabul and Islamabad are attentive to China’s interests- Pakistan due to its strategic inevitable, and the Taliban because China provides a quick and solar passage for economic development.
At the same time, playing all sides, the Taliban is also reaching India, mainly as a means of imbalance of Pakistan at a sub-traditional level, while maintaining its strong economic relations with China.
Add to the growing leverage of China above in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan; India’s strategic atmosphere in its neighborhood has become more uncertain. India’s engagement with the Taliban is cautious, and for a good reason, the historical example of Pakistan and Afghanistan has been given as a state as a state as a state terrorism. India should engage without making the Taliban so close that it weakens India’s position to exclude Pakistan’s complexity in cross-limit terror.
At the core of this dilemma is a fundamental confrontation of the vision: Chinese’s unplaced push to Asia and its impact Indo-Pacific domination, vs. vs. India’s Multipolar Regional Order. It is stressed and complicated by Russia’s declining capacity to help India balance China. Russia’s increased participation in Ukraine has weakened its global status and destroyed the reliability of its defense export sector, which has long been central for India’s military preparations.
Now India’s foreign policy discourse is a growing requirement to move towards more obvious, practical analysis. One which is not only in diplomatic outreach, but is the principle on how India will apply “new general” with Pakistan while combating China in the region. This is an achievement that India’s ruling establishment is still far away.
Swasti Rao Theprint has a consulting editor and a foreign policy specialist. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)