After the conclusion of two major G20 ministerial meetings Finance Minister and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) in Bangalore and Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM) without consensus in Delhi ukraine wardiplomatic and G-20 Officials should pause for a stock-taking exercise on the government’s strategy for its G20 presidency. The FMCBG is part of the flagship “finance track” of the 20 most advanced economies established in 1999 to help with global economic coordination following the Asian financial crisis. The second, the “Sherpa Track”, works on the G20’s target setting process. The challenges for India’s presidency should have been obvious amid dynamic geopolitical changes, with the experience India gained last year in Indonesia in bridging the Russia-West divide. In Bengaluru, however, there was a surprise when Russia and China refused to accept the language on the Ukraine war they had agreed upon only three months earlier. As a result, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman was forced to release only a Speaker’s Summary and Results document instead of a joint release. The government also decided to include paragraphs that Russia and China objected to, naming them in the document. This is a precedent, as last year, the joint communique of the Indonesian chairman at the leader level and the FMCBG expressed the sentiments of “many” and “most” countries. After the volatility in Bengaluru, it was ambitious, if not a bit surprising, that the government chose to attempt to negotiate a joint statement for the FMM. Eventually, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar also released a chairman’s summary and outcome document, citing differences over two balky paragraphs. This was the first time, as FMM has made no effort at all to issue a statement.
While the two meetings have given India’s G20 process a rocky start, the leaders’ summit in September has a long way to go. Mr Jaishankar has pointed out that most of the statements relating to issues of importance to the global south such as food and energy security and debt management have been resolved. Second, it is clear that India cannot depend on the language of the Bali summit, and that the Sherpas will need to forge a new consensus language on Ukraine. It will require a keen ear and a creative formula that takes into account Russian grievances with the language, as well as a Western desire to maintain its successes in condemning Russia’s actions in the Bali document. As host, India is in the ‘hot-seat’ and to be sure, it will benefit from the inclusion of other countries in the grouping apart from the G7, the US-led developed world and the now strong Russia-China alliance. The middle way is found.