How to win the Hot War in Ukraine and the Cold War that followed

Ukraine’s allies can congratulate themselves that they have done their part to counter Mr Putin’s brutal onslaught – although, with its courage and resolve, Ukraine itself deserves most of the credit. They have agreed on two principles: that Ukraine must win, and that it is up to President Volodymyr Zelensky to define what victory means. President Joe Biden was living proof of America’s commitment when he visited Kiev on Tuesday.

Yet even the most worthy principles have a way of wearing thin, as Mr. Putin knows all too well. He believes the West will tire and with the prospect of a new US president in 2025 and strong backing from China, he may yet be proved right. His speech this week made clear that he was rallying Russia for a war that—hot or cold—could last a generation.

In the fighting and the long years of heavily armed standoff that followed, Ukraine will prevail only if Mr Putin – or, more likely, his successor – concludes that further aggression will seriously weaken him at home. Western leaders must signal their resolve to Russia and prepare their people for the confrontation ahead. So they should mark the second year of the struggle by going beyond generalities and laying down a credible blueprint for the long struggle.

The first task is to understand what is at stake. Some Europeans still hold the belief that the peace settlement can restore On February 23, 2022, the world to its state. In effect Russia, Ukraine and the West are locked in a competition between rival systems. The West believes that sovereign Ukraine must be independent in order to become a prosperous, democratic nation. Mr Putin denies the existence of Ukraine, and says Russian civilization is at war with the West. This is a war that will test the resolve and strength of both sides.

The second task is to gain advantage on the battlefield. Spring offensives by Russia and Ukraine will reveal whether either side can take territory. The Russian attack has begun, and ground is not visible, Ukraine is likely to be in April or May. The Ukrainian military’s stated aim is to restore the 1991 borders with Crimea and the four provinces Mr Putin seized in September.

It should be taken as much as possible. The strategic reason for this is that a Dumka Ukraine would be poorer and harder to defend. The east and south of the country are sources of minerals and crops and centers of industry. Uninterrupted access to the Black Sea provides safe passage for Ukrainian exports. The political reason is that the more territory Russian forces surrender, the more clear it is that the war was futile—and the harder it will be for Mr. Putin or his successor to justify invading Ukraine again with a new army .

Should Ukraine’s Ambitions Include Crimea? In principle, yes. It is located within the recognized borders of the country. It controls access to the coast of Ukraine. It is also the area that Mr. Putin prizes most—and therefore whose liberation will drive home his defeat. In practice, taking the Crimea would be difficult. Putin can make credible threats of using nuclear weapons. Mr. Zelensky had better be sure of success: a failed assault could rally ordinary Russians behind their leader.

The stronger the regional position of Ukraine, the stronger it will be in the Cold War after the war ends. It could come down to a formal peace deal, but perhaps even an armistice, like the 70-year-old stand-off between North and South Korea. Either way, Mr. Putin simply won’t give up, so Ukraine will need credible guarantees of its security.

Ideally NATO membership would be required. Mr. Putin is hard to stop, because America doesn’t want to start a war with Russia – and rightly so. NATO membership mitigates the risk of turning the tables on Mr. Putin. It commits its members in advance to treat an attack on one country as an attack on all. If Mr. Putin invades, he will be the one to choose the superpower war.

At the recent Munich Security Conference several countries said they were in favor of it—even France may be open to the idea. However, NATO membership requires consensus. If this is unattainable, Ukraine will need bilateral guarantees and lots of weapons to make it like a European Israel, very indigestible to another Russian invasion.

Whatever happens, Ukraine’s need for weapons will last at least a decade and possibly longer. Right now it is firing roughly as many shells in a month as the US can produce in a year. Its spring campaign needed ammunition, spare parts, air-defense systems, long-range artillery, and eventually aircraft. After the war, it would need an entire arsenal of NATO-quality weapons.

Politicians insist that they have woken up to these needs, but have been slow to act. They need to change their perspective. Western countries must accept that they cannot afford peacetime weapons production levels not only to support Ukraine, but also to defend themselves. Threats abound. They need to signal long-term reloading of ammunition, invest in incremental capacity and buy more alliance-wide to build a strong industry.

long battle

Western powers may also signal their commitment to financial aid with a multi-year budget. This matters because, if the Ukrainian economy does not thrive, democracy will not thrive either. Gradually, the country’s security will weaken.

Help is essential, obviously. Given that the US provided the bulk of the weapons, most of them must have come from Europe. But private capital is also needed, and it will flow to Ukraine only if it is seen as a good place to invest.

As in Israel and South Korea, both of which have flourished despite their neighbors’ decades-long animosity, Ukraine’s greatest resource is its people. Throughout this war, they have shown that they are enterprising and creative. It is important that, when the fight is over, women and children who fled west Don’t stay put, but choose to reconnect with your partners.

And Ukraine has to overcome a history of corruption and political occupation. Here the promise of EU membership can help. The process of accession is a health system for the institutions of a country. As long as Ukraine’s candidature is handled in good faith by EU members, it could be transformative. Formal talks on accession should begin during 2023.

As the war enters its second year, some ask whether Ukraine is worth all this effort. Isn’t the crisis of survival more urgent? or climate change? Imagine if the money spent on weapons could finance development instead.

It is right to regret the war, but it is unwise to discount Mr. Putin’s aggression. A Russian victory in Ukraine will send the world down a dark path where power rules and borders are drawn by violence. This could accelerate the next, even worse, confrontation in Europe. And it will deepen the widespread sense that Western power, and the universal values ​​that underpin it, are in rapid decline.

In contrast, Ukraine’s victory has raised hopes that a sovereign democracy need not bow to its much larger, authoritarian neighbor. It will be a world that will be impressed by the resolve and courage of Mr. Zelensky and the people of Ukraine.

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