Recently, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed a resolution seeking to provide a time limit to governors to act on bills passed by the state legislature. The motivation was that Tamil Nadu Governor RN Ravi had withheld assent to 13 Bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Last week, the Supreme Court of India, while disposing of a case filed by the state of Telangana against its governor, Dr. Tamilisai Soundararajan, remarked that governors should not sit indefinitely on bills. Taking this spirit further, the idea of constitutional punctuality need not be confined to the offices of governors alone. All constitutional high offices including the President of India and Speakers of Legislative Assemblies should develop guidelines on their own to discharge their duties in a time-bound manner.
In a resolution passed on April 10, 2023, the Tamil Nadu Assembly urged the Central Government and the President to advise the Governor to take a decision on the Bills passed by the State Legislatures within a reasonable time period. The resolution, moved by Chief Minister MK Stalin, argued that it was important to protect the sovereignty of legislatures and ultimately to safeguard parliamentary democracy.
Following this, the Tamil Nadu chief minister wrote to his counterparts in other opposition-ruled states and encouraged them to pass similar resolutions in their assemblies. So far, the chief ministers of Delhi, Kerala and West Bengal have expressed their support for the resolution and its underlying principles. In the case of Telangana, the state had already filed a writ petition seeking a direction from the Supreme Court to the governor to decide on the bills passed by the assembly in a time-bound manner. In view of these developments, it would be appropriate to say that the time has come to evolve a new constitutional structure that would meet the demands of a time-bound constitutional delivery mechanism.
developing constitutional scheme
When the constitution was adopted, as a result of independence from British rule, some sovereign functions were retained for continuity in governance. Thus, no time limit was laid down for the various officers to discharge the duties arising out of the constitutional scheme. It may also be understood that the framers of the Constitution, in their contemporary wisdom, expected the Raj Bhavans to be nominated with persons who would discharge sovereign duties beyond the bounds of political partisanship.
Article 200 of the Constitution, as it stands today, limits the options before the Governor to assent to a bill sent by the legislature, or to withdraw assent, or to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President. The crux of the issue is that governors have misunderstood the task of allowing them to be given some discretionary accountability. However, an overall reading of the debates that took place in the Constituent Assembly (when this part of the Constitution was discussed and subsequently adopted) along with the direct import of the words used in the Constitution give an entirely different perspective. illustrates the interpretation.
Article 175 of the original draft brought up for discussion in 1949 read as follows: “Provided that where the Legislature consists of only one House and a Bill has been passed by that House, the Governor may, in his discretion, return the Bill together. The message requests that the House reconsider the bill.
Introducing an amendment to this article on July 30, 1949, BR Ambedkar said that “there can be no room for the discretion of the Governor to act” and recommended deleting the phrase “the Governor, in his discretion”. Therefore, the last article adopted by the Constituent Assembly and embedded in the Constitution explicitly denies any discretionary power.
This position has been strengthened by a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh and others v. State of Punjab (1974), which held that the Governor’s discretion is extremely limited and would operate even in such rare cases. in a manner which is not prejudicial to the interest of the State. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Governor shall act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Furthermore, a plain and simple reading of the article is sufficient to show that the phrase “prevents permission” has been deliberately misinterpreted to mean the withdrawal of the bill – an act colloquially known as a pocket veto. Is. Nothing can be further from constitutional reality and literary meaning. Any straight reading of withholding leave can only mean returning the Bill; And don’t back down. The problem is compounded because there is no time limit for returning the bill, and thus, the governors have not held themselves accountable to the principles of time-bound governance.
time bound governance
Other jurisdictions where similar powers have been conferred show a completely different picture. In the United Kingdom, there has not been a royal veto since 1708, when assent to the Scottish Militia Bill was vetoed by Queen Anne. Whereas in the United States, there is a time limit of 10 days for the President to approve or veto a bill. If the President does not sign or veto the bill within this time, it automatically becomes an Act. If the President vetoes and returns the bill to Congress or the Senate, both chambers of Congress must override the veto in order for it to become law.
Over time, cases involving an inexplicable delay in exercising powers by various authorities have been brought under judicial review by constitutional courts. In Keesham Meghchandra Singh v. Hon’ble Speaker Manipur (2020), the Supreme Court issued a mandate to the Speaker of the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly to decide disqualification petitions under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution within a period of four years. Week.
In a case filed by the State of Telangana against the Governor, the Supreme Court found it appropriate to invoke the spirit of Article 200. Disposing of the matter on April 24, 2023, the Court accepted that the words in Article 200, “as soon as may be after the introduction of the Bill”, carried important constitutional content and Governors should keep this in mind.
Thus, it would be appropriate for various constitutional authorities such as the Governor exercising powers under Article 200 and the Speaker acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal under the Tenth Schedule to develop strict time limits and avoid unnecessary delays. . Only such an approach will advance the constitutional scheme and protect the will of the people through legislatures.
Manuraj Shunmugasundaram, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam spokesperson and advocate before the Madras High Court. Inputs for this article by Arun PS