It’s not over until it’s over: what to expect at the mega CPC meeting in Beijing

For one, it’s not over until it’s over. In the shadowy world of China’s power politics, don’t really expect the unexpected, but don’t dismiss it either. Xi has defended his critics in the party, using his anti-corruption campaigns to arrest, intimidate and silence those seeking to challenge his authority. It is unlikely that any threat remains to bring about last-minute changes in the functioning of the party. Xi, the prince, is said to be the children of party leaders at the time of the revolution, who have graduated as king, likely to receive another coronation.

For another, Xi Jinping has chosen to shape China’s history in the mold of his choice. It completely puts the Communist Party in control of strategy, policy and enforcement. China may describe its economic system as socialism with Chinese characteristics, but it is quintessentially capitalist, in that labor is a commodity, Karl Marx’s own touchstone to capitalism. A key characteristic of capitalism is that its talent for creative destruction comes from, and is expressed through, numerous, independent, decentralized decisions by economic agents, when the policy landscape is shaped by the state.

When Alibaba founder Jack Ma publicly criticized China’s harsh regulation in late 2020, he was chasing constraints on the need for decentralized decision-making. Xi’s policy choices shut down Jack Ma, pulled the plug on Ma’s planned public issue for Ant Financial – and made China’s high-flying tech sector a quiet vassal of the state and party, converting Uighur nationality into Xinjiang. Providing suppressed facial recognition software; artificial intelligence that lets the party censor Chinese social media; And sports for China’s youth that explicitly promote masculine or feminine qualities, barring gender fluidity and the ethereal styles of K-pop, are considered obstacles to reversing the course of China’s population decline.

In massive re-education campaigns for Xinjiang’s Muslims, second-class status to their native languages ​​in Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and promotion of party cells in every factory and every business, Xi adopted a form of total control. Chosen that he hopes will prevent the collapse in China of communist control of the kind that took place in the Soviet Union. And, of course, he controls the army. To justify his controls, he calls for general prosperity, expressing dissatisfaction over the vast inequalities in the country.

However, when the boundaries of acceptable conduct become too rigid, they also become brittle. Xi’s ascent to a third term as party supremo is likely to either stifle further innovation, stifle Chinese development, or set the stage for a violent breakdown of barriers imposed by the party.

Xi has promised to make China great again, in an echo of Trump’s aggressive rebuff, though the words he uses differ. That greatness emphasizes the territorial reclamation that China regards as its historical extension. This of course brings into conflict with India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, Laos, and even Nepal and Bhutan, in addition to Taiwan.

All South East Asian countries will be happy to see that India is emerging as a force against China. India’s size – economic, military, geographical and demographic – makes India a natural force for China. And that is why the US was eager to free India from the technology-denial regime in which the West had placed India after its nuclear tests, and a nuclear deal with India.

As India grows its economy, international partnership and geopolitical importance, China must decide whether to expand its common base with India or halt India’s growth. Regressing on a rules-based world trading order or climate justice, India and China can make common reason as well to demand a multipolar rather than a US-dominated world. But progress on such cooperation depends on China agreeing to its boundary with India. Xi Jinping has given no indication of privileging the strategic common land over Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims.

The Party Congress also matters because of its potential backing of China’s determination to carry out America’s strategy of negating China’s advanced technology with repeated efforts to develop its own alternatives. India will need to develop its own path for technological access beyond blackmail by any power.

There will also be two immediate areas of concern, albeit not directly, on Congress. The zero COVID strategy China is following is killing China’s growth and disrupting global supply chains, contributing to shortages, inflation and slowing growth around the world, which snakes through China. A re-elected, confident Xi may be encouraged to turn on the Covid, without fear of being seen as intimidated.

Another area is Russia’s continued support for the war in Ukraine. True, it is not the personal chemistry between Putin and Xi that underlies China’s stand on the matter. Instead, China needs to maintain a Russian geopolitical powerhouse as an ongoing concern, in order to avoid being the sole center of US military attention, which explains the support. But Xi’s personal role is also not irrelevant.

As China continues to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy, and scramble to develop similar technological and military capabilities, it matters to the world what kind of determination China’s leadership will take on that challenge. Will bring resolution The answer lies with the party Congress.