Kabul, Kashmir and the return of real politics

While the Taliban’s return to Kabul may have ended the internal war within Afghanistan, the geopolitical struggle for the plundering of the Taliban’s victory has just begun. In an unfriendly neighbourhood, New Delhi’s efforts to forge a regional consensus to stabilize Afghanistan, even if wise and timely, will only achieve limited success because of the China-Pakistan alliance and its interests in and in Afghanistan. Worse yet, India’s progress in the face of the Taliban and attempts to build a regional consensus on Afghanistan could erode India-Pakistan relations and pose challenges to India in Kashmir.

Post-American Afghanistan

While the recently held Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan on November 10, 2021 was an important initiative to help stabilize Afghanistan, the grim reality is that the two countries that are key to stabilizing Afghanistan – China and Pakistan – decided to stay away from it. , Russia or the Central Asian states have neither the capacity nor the willingness to play a role in an autonomous Afghanistan with large Chinese or Pakistani designs. Iran has limited interests in Afghanistan and is unlikely to go against the Chinese plan for the region, especially in the broader context under United States sanctions.

While China is approaching Taliban-led Afghanistan at a cautiously slow pace, it is clearly poised to be in the driving seat of the region’s engagement with the region, if not global, in the coming months. It is only a matter of time before Beijing recognizes the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and it is likely to coordinate its recognition with Russia and Pakistan. China’s long-term vision for Afghanistan revolves around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, of which Afghanistan has been a part since May 2016. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is also seen as a key component within the larger Chinese BRI. The project and Afghanistan could eventually become part of the CPEC if and when the Taliban regime stabilizes itself in the country. A lot is riding on the Taliban for China.

Even as Pakistan accepts a challenge for itself from a volatile Afghanistan, its current Afghan strategy is that of a winning approach. While it lobbies the international community to help prevent Afghanistan from going into further turmoil, it is determined to keep India as far away from Kabul as possible, even as the Taliban want India to continue engagement and Provide development assistance. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is the mother of all zero sum games.

help or not

The international community in Afghanistan faces a dilemma when it comes to making a decision to help the country get back on its feet. The Taliban and Pakistan refer to the US-led coalition as ‘colonists’ who have just evacuated Afghan territory; And in the same breath, they seek help from the same ‘former colonists’. Second, if the US and the West actually send aid to Afghanistan, it may or may not reach the people. And yet, if they do not help, the Afghans will suffer untold suffering. But perhaps what bothers the West the most is that if they stabilize the country, they will still be called ex-colonists, and Pakistan and China will benefit from it geopolitically, in the sense that It’s a thankless job for the West. So the question before Western leaders is how and when to provide structured incentives to the Taliban.

India’s dilemma

India now faces a new dilemma in Afghanistan – the first was to decide whether to contain the Taliban. Successive governments in Afghanistan, including the current Taliban regime, have sought to build ties with India, which has upset Pakistan. Pakistan has always been deeply suspicious of the growing India-Afghanistan ties, whoever is in charge of Kabul. The present dilemma of India is also on the same lines. The Taliban wants India to get involved and help stabilize the country, but Pakistan is angered by this. Recently, the Pakistani National Security Advisor had criticized India for contacting the Taliban delegation in Doha. And now, Pakistan refused to participate in the regional security meeting on Afghanistan called by India. These examples indicate that Pakistan would not want India to either develop closer ties with the Taliban or be part of any regional arrangement to stabilize the country. Not only this, there is also the possibility that the closer India is to the Taliban, the more the Pakistani side will increase the heat (read ‘attack’) in Jammu and Kashmir. By maintaining ties with the Taliban and calling a regional security meeting in New Delhi, India has indicated that this is an acceptable risk.

Let me explain this dilemma a little more. Very ruthlessly told, if the Taliban regime in Kabul is to stabilize the country without India’s aid, the more likely Pakistan is to do the bidding. face to face India. On the other hand, the more India helps Taliban-led Afghanistan, the more Pakistan will advance in Kashmir. It is a catch-22 situation in which India find themselves. And yet, India has no option but to engage the Taliban.

Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Prior to the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021 and the earlier Pakistani desire for reconciliation with India on Kashmir has now disappeared. This is at least partly due to Pakistani triumphalism regarding the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. Bilateral backchannel talks in late 2020 and early 2021 reportedly discussed a reduction in violence in Kashmir and a political understanding with regard to Kashmir. The February ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan and the subsequent reduction in violence in Kashmir (ie, Pakistani infiltration of terrorists into Kashmir, terrorist attacks in Kashmir and ceasefire violations along the Line of Control) were a direct result of backchannel understanding. between the two sides. The agreement lasted until August when the Taliban took over. Since then, violence data shows that understanding of backchannel with violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been gradually increasing along all three indicators, albeit slowly. In addition, sentiments from across the border also indicate that the earlier Pakistani stance that it would accept the Indian decision to withdraw special status to Kashmir (in return for New Delhi’s restoration of statehood to Kashmir and political activity in the state). Allowing) has now changed. , It now demands that India completely return to the position it had on Kashmir before August 5, 2019. In other words, the Pakistani reconciliation approach on Kashmir lasted until the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. At best, it is a post-facto change in Pakistani strategy, and at worst, Pakistan was taking India along.

The appointment of former President of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Sardar Masood Khan, as Pakistan’s ambassador to the US is perhaps another indication of the centrality of Kashmir in Pakistan’s foreign policy in the wake of the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul.

If this analysis is accurate, we are likely to see more wars and violence in the context of J&K. This would mean that any prospect of India-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan would be very difficult to achieve. Beijing will play along; So will Iran and Central Asian countries for the most part. The option for New Delhi is to coordinate its Afghan policy with Moscow, Washington and various western capitals, while continuing to engage with the Taliban.

Happyman Jacob teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research