In 1980, faced with the prospect of the Soviet Union expanding its reach to the Gulf, the Carter administration in the United States came out with an aggressive approach. Last year, America was dealt a double blow in Asia – in February, the Shah’s regime in Iran, one of the pillars of America’s West Asia policy, collapsed; And in December, the Soviet Union sent the Red Army into Afghanistan. Outlining his policy formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter, in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, stated that “any external force should not compromise its vital interests in order to gain control of the Persian Gulf region”. would be considered an assault. of the United States, and such an attack will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”.
Editorial | The New Reality: On Saudi Arabia-Iran Reconciliation and China’s Role
The Carter Doctrine would continue to guide the policy of successive administrations towards the Gulf and ensure that the region remained an exclusive US sphere of influence – until recently. There has been a lot of talk about the shifting of the Arabian sands for some time now. However, it was on full display when agreement between saudi arabia and iran Earlier this month, in secret talks held by China to normalize relations. Put this in context: The US remained a bystander while its global rival (China) coaxed an ally (Saudi Arabia) and an archenemy (Iran) together to reach a potentially game-changing agreement in the region (the Gulf). brought. Considered as a specific sphere of influence. This practically put an end to the Carter Doctrine.
past mistakes
It didn’t happen overnight. Over the past 20 years, the US has made several mistakes in West Asia, which has led to a decline in its overall influence and an associated policy reorientation by its allies. Take the cases of Iraq, Syria and Iran – countries that the US invaded, brought about regime change and occupied; two, a country where it sought regime change without a full-scale invasion; and three, a country it sought to both include and annex.
When America invaded Iraq (land) on March 20, 2003, it was at the height of its power. America’s Arab allies lined up to support the war. But what he saw from a security perspective was the mindless destruction of the Iraqi state, which led to sectarian bloodshed and the rise of radical Islamic organizations such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, which later morphed into the Islamic State, and later the Iraqi State. destabilized. Area. From a geopolitical perspective, the invasion of Iraq removed a buffer that the Sunni Arab Gulf monarchies had between themselves and a Shia theocratic Iran, and presented post-Saddam Iraq on a platter to Shia parties whose Had historical ties with Tehran.
When the Syrian Civil War broke out, the Arab monarchies saw an opportunity to push Iran back by ousting the regime in Damascus. The US supported regime change factions, called for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad, offered aid to the rebels, and launched a covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program. But, after burning its fingers in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, America’s appetite for another full-scale military intervention was already waning. When the US stopped intervening in Syria, Russia and Iran quickly stepped in and averted a civil war. America’s allies, from Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Qatar to Turkey, who had bet on anti-Assad forces, watched helplessly as the Syrian army and Iran-trained militias, covered by Russian jets, destroyed the rebellion. done.
US President Barack Obama, who felt that America’s endless entanglements in the region were slowing his efforts to address emerging conventional challenges, reached out to Iran and brokered a multilateral agreement on its nuclear program. Obama’s plan was to ease tensions with Iran and persuade America’s Arab allies and Tehran to “share” the region. But the US struck a deal with Tehran at a time when its own actions had further strengthened Iran, angering both its Gulf allies and Israel. When US President Donald Trump scrapped the nuclear deal, he welcomed it. But Mr. Trump had no choice but to check Iran’s immediate conventional military might. While Tehran responded to Mr Trump’s “maximum pressure” with maximum resistance, specifically targeting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the US looked away.
current limits
Today America is aware of its limits. It also faces major traditional challenges elsewhere. Therefore, to address this task of maintaining US influence in West Asia with fewer commitments, the US proposed collectiveizing its alliances – bringing Arab allies and Israel closer together in a collective front against Iran. Israel could play a bigger security role. ,
But there are at least three problems with this approach. One, with the removal of West Asia from priority, US influence on its allies is waning, which is encouraging allies to make their own foreign decisions.
Second, Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories could sabotage the alliance’s bid to coalesce. The UAE not only agreed to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, but also showed warmth towards Syria and Turkey by revising ties with Iran. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia resisted embracing Israel. Instead, the Kingdom, arguably the most powerful Arab country, saw an alternative to stability in a China-mediated peace plan with Iran. Third, Israel, the centerpiece of America’s strategy of collectivism, is itself resisting American influence. Israel’s new government is pressing ahead with its judicial reform plan despite pressure from Washington. Israel also refused to join Western sanctions against Russia and refused to send arms to Ukraine.
multi column field
As the US de-prioritises West Asia, a vacuum is left behind, its allies seek to establish more predictable relationships with friends and foes, building their own spheres of influence and expanding the scope of the region. emerging as a new pillar. Israel seeks to strengthen its ties with the Arab world to confront Iran without compromising on Palestine. Iran wants to break out of the economic stranglehold of sanctions and realize its true potential. Turkey wants to return to territory it once dominated, and Saudi Arabia wants to be the natural leader of the Arab world. China, the new superpower, wants to ensure that its economic interests are protected.
This does not mean that the US is going to withdraw from the region. The US has several bases and tens of thousands of troops stationed across the region, and will continue to play a major security role. But the Gulf or greater West Asia is no longer the exclusive US sphere of influence as envisioned by Mr. Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski. It is too early to say whether regional realignment, including the Saudi-Iran reconciliation, will survive the notoriously fractious geopolitics of West Asia. But there are three constants in this whirlwind – the declining ability of the US to shape geopolitical outcomes in the region, the continued rise of China and the growing appetite of US allies to make autonomous foreign policy choices. This is new territory for America in West Asia.
stanly.johny@thehindu.co.in