Operation Sindore is on ‘poses’ and although the ceasefire began somewhat to some extent on Saturday evening (May 10), it appears to be holding. On May 12, the military operations of the two directors (DGMO)-India and Pakistan-Neo-Locked negotiations and discussed further D-Susclavery measures to reduce the presence of contingent in further areas, which had seen a buildup in recent weeks.
Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced, “Operation Sindoor re-defined the fight against terror … to establish a new general in a new benchmark and anti-terrorism measures.” Kinetic vengeance is not new. The Modi government operated the “Surgical Strike” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the URI attack, and Pulwama attacked an air attack on a Jaish-e-Mohammed (Jame) camp in Balakot in 2019 in 2019. Nevertheless, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.
Eighty-eight hours for a ceasefire
After the initiative attack on 22 April 2025, it was clear that the Government of India would respond with force. The only question was when and in what way. Following measures announced in those days, such as reducing diplomatic appearance, closing of business, closing the Vaga-Atari border crossing, canceling the existing visa, and keeping the Indus Water Treaty in the abenses, was a strong response, but not an alternative to kinetic retaliation.
The fortnight intervene until 7 May was used to finalize goals for kinetic vengeance and increase diplomatic engagement at all levels. After 2019, the Indian officials were certain that, sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would force a calibrated military reaction. This demanded plan and periodic update based on developing technical capabilities. Eventually, nine goals were chosen from about two dozen options. In Delhi and other major capitals, intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, an acceptance of India’s right to target terrorists and their infrastructure (although sometimes with cavets) prepares land. India’s challenge was to restore the red lines while managing the escalation story and leaving the D-System option open.
Shortly after the morning strike on 7 May (Operation Sindoor), Pakistan DGMO chief General Kashif Abdullah was informed about the nine places which were closely associated with terrorist groups targeted as targeted nine places, Lashkar-e-Tabiba (Letter), Jem and Hizb-ul-Mujaiden. India emphasized that Operation was against the vermilion terrorists and not against the Pakistani Army or Pakistani people. It states that if Pakistani forces responded, India will reserve the right to retaliation. Pakistan accepted the strike (at six places) and claimed that it had fallen between five to six Indian aircraft, including some Rafale fighter jets, although it was denied by India. This, offering an off-ramp de-sizecase option, claimed success in the United Nations Security Council, where it is currently a non-established member in terms of landing of Indian aircraft, reducing the impact of Indian attacks and taking the issue of violation of its region to the United Nations Security Council.
However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to enhance the image and vowed military vengeance. In the following two nights, Pakistan extended drone infiltration, along with some littering mutations and missile firing, 36 locations along the 3,300 km long India-Pakistan border, more than the intention of investigating the interval in India’s air defense. India, with its declared Quid Pro Kwo Plus policy, targeted Pakistani Air Base and Air Defense Units. However, Pakistan refused its infiltration, as it convicted India for repeated violations and attacks. For an Indian warning on 9 May, its air space for civilian air traffic remained open, it was threatening civilian air traffic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting was required on 9 May to approve the next installment of the IMF extended fund facility (loan for loan).
A dramatic growth was observed on the night of 9–10 May. Pakistan claimed 26 Indian goals “rebuilding detention after repeatedly after Indian attacks”. India admitted that “Air Force stations Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur and Bhuj” limited loss to equipment and personnel. “The Indian reaction of the morning of May 10 was cruel and from the scardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahm Yaar Khan and Jacobabad to nine military aerial areas as well as three forward air defense units were also targeted. Scalp and Brahmos missiles used stand-off weapons were targeted as well as crystal maze, Hammer and Spice 2000 Else. The hours saw a intensive diplomatic activity between Washington, Islamabad and Delhi with a hurry of telephone calls. After a conversation between two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into force on May 10 (1700 hours) on May 10 (1700 hours).
Role of America
Initially. However, within 24 hours, the US assessment changed as it indicated attacks from cross -border and reports that Pakistan was determining the meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA), or the meeting of the body overseeing the nuclear arsenal of the country. While Mr. Vance spoke to Mr. Modi on 9 May (Indian time), sharing the concerns of America the next day (Indian time), US -time US secretary Marco Rubio spoke with the Chief General Asim Munir of the Pakistani Army, followed by the Minister of External Affairs of his counterparts. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khwaja Asif announced on 10 May that no NCA met.
On May 10, the message of US President Donald Trump made an official announcement about the ceasefire, which questioned the role of America. The fact is that after 1998, the US has played a role in increasing several crises: Kargil in 1999, Indian Parliament attack in 2001 and Operation Parkaram in 2008 Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, exception to Pakistan due to surgical strikes of 2016, Pakistan was denied Pakistan. Nevertheless, none of these examples have led American mediation and this time there is little reason to think. There are only two ways to avoid external intervention – first, increase economic and military gaps with Pakistan, and second, there are independent communication channels between the two countries.
Struggle under nuclear shade
Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-hathiyar-states, Pakistan’s approach has been to reduce the space for the traditional war, shine the nuclear card and threaten early atomic use. It aims to disrupt India’s location for kinetic response to a terrorist attack. However, it is no longer working. If the 2016 ‘Surgical Strikes’ made the Kinetic vengeance to be normal, Balakot started aerial power in 2019, and Operation Sindor expanded it to cover everyone in Pakistan. So far, India has emphasized that it is retaliating against terrorist goals – launch pads in 2016, a balot training camp in 2019, and now nine places (Operation Sindore). However, Mr. Modi has added a new dimension.
The expander in the ‘new general’, which he mentioned on May 12, reiterated the right to respond to any terrorist attack in India and was not done by “nuclear blackmail”, but said that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or governments that sponsor terrorism. This joint puts the Pakistani Army in notice that next time, India’s kinetic response under an operation vermilion 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist goals. The strict situation is clear in their statement, “Terror and talks cannot go together; terror and business cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”
By expanding the scope of traditional operations below the nuclear limit, Shri Modi is demanding zero to the nuclear overhang, but this requires a significant expansion in traditional capabilities. The ability to suppress hostile aerial rescue and adopt a network-centered-ignorant will need to be introduced to originally manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for monitoring, communication and targeting. In addition, India needs to attract lessons from intelligence and security laps, which motivated Pahalgam to better plan, predict, and to prevent future Pahalgamas. Only then the expander will be a reliable preventive against the ‘new general’ future terrorist attacks.
Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and is currently prestigious Fellow (CSDR) in the Strategic and Defense Research Council
Published – May 17, 2025 12:16 AM IST