IIt is now exactly 60 years since thousands of regular Chinese troops were deployed along India’s northern borders, from Ladakh in the west to the then-Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the east. But, much to the surprise of many, in 1962, after more than a month of fighting, and inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Indian forces guarding the border, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and their troops was taken back to the pre-war position.
Nehru’s fault?
There are many theories as to why the Chinese attacked and acted as they did, and over the years Neville Maxwell’s india china war, which was first published in 1970, dominated the fiction. According to Maxwell, India was to blame and cited a classified Indian intelligence document compiled by Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Preminder Singh Bhagat to support his claim. The war was further escalated by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s further policy and the creation of Indian defense installations not only along the line that separates NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh, and China-occupied Tibet. But the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report does not say so. This only suggests that Nehru’s government did not provide the army with the necessary tools to implement the policy ahead, and that there was a lack of cooperation between the government in New Delhi and the military in the region.
Furthermore, it takes on its own absurdity that such a massive attack could have been fueled by Nehru’s forward policy, which was decided at a meeting in New Delhi on 2 November 1961 – less than a year before the war. Earlier If Maxwell is to be believed, China would have been able to build new roads and military camps in the area during that time, and move at least 80,000 troops and tons of supplies, including heavy military equipment, to some of the most difficult areas. World. Those soldiers would also have to get used to high-altitude warfare and set up supply lines and secure back bases inside Tibet. In addition, Brigadier John Dalvi, who was captured by the Chinese and remained a prisoner of war until May 1963, found that the Chinese had set up prisoner of war camps to hold 3,000 men. Chinese interpreters who knew all the major Indian languages were present in those camps. Chinese preparations for war with India may have begun years before the attacks occurred, and not shortly after the November 1961 announcement in New Delhi.
Read also: Why would Nehru become the judge of history by Modi’s encounters with China?
Was Zhou Enlai flexible?
According to another theory, suggested by Avtar Singh Bhasin in his 2021 book Nehru, Tibet and ChinaThe 1962 war could have been avoided had Nehru been more willing to listen to China’s version of the border dispute. While Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai showed some degree of flexibility in his letters to Nehru, the latter stuck to his belief of where the border should be. Nehru’s “rigor”, Bhasin argues, “stands in the way of finding solutions through dialogue and discussion by sitting around a table.”
Bhasin’s book is carefully researched and brilliantly written, but fails to take into account that Zhou’s diplomatic nuances were the exact opposite of what was written about Nehru in communist, Chinese-language publications . In an editorial on 2 September 1949, sean hwa get In July of that year, after the Tibetan authorities decided to expel Chinese citizens from the country, it was stated: “The case … was a conspiracy by the local Tibetan authorities through the provocation of the British imperialists and their lackluster Nehru administration in India. ” In August and September 1949, shiji zishioA Shanghai-based fortnight, characterized Nehru as a “running dog of imperialism” and a “loyal slave” of the revolution’s enemies such as Chiang Kai-shek.
Then there is the official Chinese version, recently expressed by author Zhang Xiaokang in an essay published on January 13 of this year “In Commemoration of 60 Years.th 1962 marks the anniversary of the self-defense counterattack on the India-China border. Zhang echoed Maxwell’s version of events in some ways, saying that the Chinese army, “won the battle, completely crushing the massive attack of the Indian offensive. [and] wiped out the main force of Indian soldiers participating in the war.” Many, even the most neutral observers, would argue that the less said about that fictional account of the 1962 war, the better.
Read also: ‘Expansionist’ Nehru, Tibetan Autonomy, ‘New China’ – Why did Mao go to war with India in 1962?
Look at China’s internal problems
So why did the Chinese attack, and when was the decision to launch a war against India taken? Basically, there were three reasons behind the decision. The first was that India had given the Dalai Lama asylum after his flight from Tibet in March 1959 and allowed him to set up a government in exile, first in Mussoorie and then in McLeod Ganj. At a meeting on 25 March 1959, when the Dalai Lama was still on his way to India, China’s Supreme Leader Mao Zedong as well as Deng Xiaoping decided that “when the time comes, we will certainly settle the account with him.” . [the Indians],
The attack must also be understood in the context of internal problems in China at the time. In 1958, Mao launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward to modernize China. By 1961, anywhere from 17 to 45 million people had died as a result of his policies, which caused famine rather than any rapid industrialization. Mao was maligned and, most likely, on the way out. They must have felt that they had to seize power – and the best way to do this would be to unite the nation, and especially the armed forces, against an external enemy. India was a “soft” target as it had given refuge to the Dalai Lama and then there was the border issue which China did not recognize.
The third reason was that until the outbreak of the 1962 war, India, and especially Nehru, was the main voice of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, which was clearly demonstrated at a conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The movement was born, Zhou was present at the meeting – but Beijing had other ideas plans and ideas. It wanted to be the “revolutionary armour” of what would later be known as the Third World, and India had to be detached from the position it had held throughout the 1950s. In that regard, the 1962 war worked to the advantage of China. Nehru died a broken man in 1964 and Mao became a symbol of many Asian and African liberation movements.
There may not be another all-out war in the Himalayas, but China’s obstinate attitude and behavior in the South China Sea and its increasingly provocative incursions into the Indian Ocean could lead to serious regional conflicts. Then there is the question of China as the world’s largest dam-builder, with rivers flowing from Tibet and Yunnan flowing downstream into other countries, including India, without even consulting the affected countries. Capitalist China of 2022 may not be under Mao’s dogmatic rule, but it has not given up on its ambitions to become a dominant power in Asia, perhaps even in the world.
bertilla Lintner is a Thailand-based journalist and author of China’s India War: The Confrontation Course on the Roof of the World. Thoughts are personal.