PPakistan is once again in trouble. Since the return of the Afghan Taliban (hereinafter the Taliban) to power in August 2021, Pakistan has saw There has been an increase in violence perpetrated by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which uses Afghanistan as a safe haven. The Taliban’s reluctance to rein in the TTP or hand it over to Islamabad has disappointed Pakistan, where many celebrated the Taliban’s victory over Ashraf Ghani. In 2021–2022, the Taliban mediated a ceasefire between the Pakistan Army and the TTP. TTP, however, terminated for a ceasefire in November 2022, ordering its fighters to resume their attacks.
Pakistani opinion and decision makers are now suggest Gave a tough fight to TTP initially in Pakistan and if needed in Afghanistan as well. But Pakistani decision-makers should remember that they have tried both dialogue and fighting since the establishment of the TTP in 2007 – neither approach works in Pakistan’s favour. Therefore, given Pakistan’s past experiences with the TTP, any future military operations by the Pakistan Army are likely to fall short of achieving long-term strategic success. Afghanistan is also in no position to help Pakistan in its TTP problem. At this point Pakistanis should accept to be with TTP. Although such a proposal may sound aggressive, given the historical and ground realities, Pakistan’s options are limited.
Afghanistan and the TTP Challenge
First of all, it must be remembered that Afghans do not take back the security they give to others. The Taliban preferred to lose their government in 2001 instead hand over osama bin laden to the United States. The only major exception to this practice is the Afghan government’s decision in 1941, during World War II, to allow German and Italian nationals to leave Afghanistan on the condition that the Allies would guarantee their safe return to their home countries. Even at the height of World War II, while being sandwiched between the British and the Russians, Afghanistan did not cede to the Germans and Italians, to the British or the Russians.
Additionally, Afghanistan has offered protection to any Pashtuns fleeing the Pashtun majority areas of the subcontinent (India under British rule, and Pakistan since 1947). From Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901) to President Mohammad Najibullah (1987–1992), this was an unwritten policy of successive Afghan governments. Afghanistan also hosted dissident Pakistani Baloch and Sindhi elements—including the sons and followers of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This exercise helped Afghanistan maintain influence among Pakistanis and put pressure on Pakistan when necessary.
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Since the Afghans have not lost interest in the Pashtun majority areas of Pakistan, the TTP’s demand to restore the tribal status of the former tribal areas (hereafter the Tribal Areas), where the TTP would have greater autonomy, is a prospect much more attractive to the Afghans. . ignore. Afghans have historically played a self-appointed role in advocating for greater rights for Pashtun tribes in the subcontinent. More importantly, the restoration of the tribal areas would also have a practical utility for Afghanistan: relocating the TTP and other terrorist groups from Afghanistan to the tribal areas.
Apart from the historical baggage, there are also ideological links between the Taliban and the TTP. Like the Taliban themselves, the TTP respects the Taliban leader, Hibat Ullah Akhundzada, as its leader, No Taliban leader will ever hand over his followers and supporters who fight side by side with his fighters to any other country. The TTP’s claim that it seeks to impose Sharia in the tribal areas also resonates with Taliban leaders, who claim to have fought to implement Sharia as well.
The Taliban cannot afford to forcefully drive out the TTP. The Taliban do not want to create pro-TTP and anti-TTP factional divisions among themselves. It is also unclear whether the Taliban have the capability to take military action against the TTP. More importantly, even if the Taliban were able to do so, they would not have taken military action against the TTP to avoid pushing the TTP towards an alliance with the so-called Taliban. islamic state, It seems unnecessary for the Taliban to fight at the request of Pakistan with fellow Pashtun Taliban, whose ideology and leaders are similar to theirs.
Furthermore, the tribal Pashtuns, who make up the bulk of the TTP today and live along the Afghan-Pakistani border, have a long history of resisting outsiders such as the Mughals, the British, the Soviets and NATO. Of particular importance is the struggle of the Pashtuns of the border areas against the British, with whom they fought for a century. Despite spending tens of millions of pounds in military campaigns and losing countless soldiers, Britain was unable to subdue Pashtun tribes such as the Masud (aka Mehsud), Wazir, Orakzais, Mohmand and Afridi.
Tribal attacks on cities and towns, including Peshawar—which have been replaced by ambushes and suicide attacks by the TTP—were common under the British, who could barely leave their encampments after dark. As such, history suggests that military operations against Pashtun tribes will only add to the problems of the Pakistan Army. The tribes will defend their honor and land at any cost. If they needed to, they would go to Afghanistan to live to fight another day. But the tribals neither forget nor forgive anything. The TTP, apart from being a terrorist organization, is a channel to express frustration over the Pakistan Army and its continued presence in the tribal lands.
The idea that the Pakistan Army could handle Pashtuns better than the British Indian Army because of the presence of a large number of ethnic Pashtuns in the former should be re-evaluated. The British Indian Army also had a large number of ethnic Pashtuns. The British also, at times, raised and disbanded tribal militias, composed entirely of Pashtuns, to combat fellow Pashtun tribesmen. The presence of Pashtuns on both sides then did not help stop the violence; It won’t be helpful anymore.
Also, the notion that TTP has no popular support in the tribal areas needs to be revisited. For decades, the Afghan government lied to us that the Taliban had no popular support in Afghanistan. A similar statement has come to the fore in Pakistan as well. The Pakistani government would find it embarrassing and costly to admit that the TTP enjoys popular support among Pashtuns in Pakistan. Ironically, the TTP’s main objective of imposing Shariat is widely shared, especially by religious circles across Pakistan.
Finally, the TTP also enjoys some degree of popular support among Afghans, just as the Taliban enjoyed popular support among Pakistanis. Apart from ethnic and linguistic ties, Afghans believe that if Taliban got popular support from Pakistan to implement Sharia in Afghanistan, why should TTP not get popular support from Afghanistan to implement Sharia in Pakistan? If the implementation of the Shari’a is a noble cause, it should be equally noble in both countries.
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road ahead
First, despite the seriousness of the situation, there is no easy way out for Pakistan from this crisis. Pakistan may want to take military action against TTP. The TTP would cross into Afghanistan, wait for an opportunity to re-enter Pakistan, and stage violent attacks – as the Taliban did during the Karzai and Ghani governments, but in the opposite direction. The fence on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border has proven to be unreliable, and can be easily removed or blown up, or tunneled under it.
Second, the Pakistan Army – with honor (Faith), Taqwa (purity), and Jihad Motto- India-centric. Fighting fellow Muslims in Pakistan is the last thing the Pakistan Army would want to do. But more than the army, it is the people of the tribal areas who do not seem to be supportive of any further military operations in their area. Their flock at Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) rallies against the war in the tribal areas is an indication of how fed up the tribes are with the ongoing military operations by the Pakistan Army.
Third, waging a war against the TTP inside Afghanistan could have serious long-term security consequences for Pakistan. In retaliation, the Taliban will stop supporting Pakistan. The Taliban would also switch from tacit tolerance to active support for both the TTP and the Baloch militants, who have kept their insurgency on and off since the inception of Pakistan. Pakistan should take seriously the risk of TTP joining hands with Baloch insurgents. Such an alliance would spell disaster for Pakistan, especially if it gets active support from India.
Pakistan’s repeated incursions into Afghanistan also threaten to push the Taliban towards India. Pakistan avoided cooperating sincerely with the Karzai and Ghani governments because they were considered pro-India. Now by isolating the Taliban, Pakistan will achieve the exact opposite of what it intended.
Fourth, Pakistan may make up its mind to seek US support against the Taliban and the TTP, especially in carrying out drone strikes in Afghanistan. Drones have taken countless innocent lives and contributed to resentment against those who operated and facilitated them. One reason for the Taliban’s bitterness towards Pakistan is Pakistan’s complicity in drone attacks against Pakistan.
Domestically, if Pakistan’s collaboration with the United States against Afghanistan is exposed, Pakistani authorities will face a popular backlash, especially within religious circles, and will be forced to take stronger measures against the TTP. will lose support. It is also very likely that the United States will leave Pakistan to deal with drones and other issues related to Afghanistan – for which Pakistan is not prepared.
Finally, the Taliban do not fear border closure with Pakistan, should Pakistan close its borders with Afghanistan to punish the Taliban. The Taliban can rely on Iran and Central Asia for trade. In retaliation, the Taliban would not allow Pakistan to trade with Central Asia through Afghanistan, which would cost Pakistan millions of dollars annually. Illegal drugs, which the Taliban have been trading and smuggling for decades, will still make their way into the international market regardless of the status of the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Pakistanis should be prepared for tough times to come. There are no easy solutions. TTP is not going to disappear. For TTP to deny Pakistan victory, it only needs to survive. Thus, Pakistanis are advised to accept living with TTP for the time being. In the long run, Pakistan may want to do two things: first, try to wean its society from extremism so that a lasting and real peace can be achieved; Second, to genuinely engage and listen to the Pashtun tribes through their elders, without trying to impose anything on them from Rawalpindi.
Arvin Rahi is a former advisor to the governor of Parwan in Afghanistan. Thoughts are personal. this article Originally Appeared on the National Interest website.