Kyiv residents these past days have seen shells rain down, as they did in 1941, then at the start of a brutal war in which Ukraine endured unimaginable suffering. As photos of families scramble to safety in basements and subways while rocket attacks light up the sky, it’s hard not to compare. Except this time, the danger is from the east. It is an imperfect parallel, but a vivid one for many Ukrainians that conflicts with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim of “rejecting” Ukraine. No matter his rhetoric—shining on inconvenient details like the Nazi-Soviet pact—that 1941 is actually a cause of the invasion, an attempt to avoid the errors of “appeasement”. “We will not make this mistake a second time,” he said in his Thursday speech.
But it is also a parallel that the Kremlin would be unwise to dismiss. Blitzkrieg campaigns are fascinating in the eyes of planners but are rarely painless or concise—even for those with clear military superiority. Russian forces may well overwhelm the Ukrainian capital, but taking control in the face of a hostile population, not to mention achieving Putin’s long-term goals of regime change and security, is a different matter altogether.
It is worth noting that Ukraine has already withdrawn Russia more effectively than many thought. It is still early days, but the Russian attack has not been surgical nor has displayed a particularly sophisticated strategy. Then there is the question of proportion. Combat theory states that attackers need at least a 3:1 ratio to dominate defenders in the first place, and maintains the same in conflict with new technologies and autonomous systems, as in the Australian Army. I was told by General Mick Ryan, a retired major in the US. , Russia’s estimated 190,000 personnel, meanwhile, face a force of 205,000 active Ukrainian troops. Fighting on the ground, as Ryan points out, is always uncertain and unpredictable, and Moscow may have underestimated the difficulties ahead.
Of course, Russia has more resources than it can deploy. Western intelligence reports suggest Moscow plans to take control of the city with “heavy force”. A panic exit – if the number is sufficiently large it will be difficult to back off. But it is at best a battle won, not an overall victory, let alone a long-term success on Putin’s terms, which would include securing Ukraine’s allegiance to Russia. Russia’s military is far better trained and equipped than when I was with them in Grozny two decades ago. Moscow has spent heavily on overhauling its armed forces for the moment. The commanding officers are ready, as are their concepts. But the Russians are attacking a neighbor with whom many may have family ties—they are not protecting their livelihoods, homes, families or cherished values such as democracy and freedom like the Ukrainians.
But a fundamental question is whether this victory, as Putin sees it—securing a friendly government, stopping Ukraine’s westward drift—can be achieved with his current strategy. The Kremlin seems to be achieving the opposite. It says it wants to liberate Ukraine, not occupy it. He wants to replace the President of Ukraine with a friendly alternative.
But Ukraine, despite all its troubles, is a democracy, not an autocracy. Its leadership cannot be changed simply by removing the incumbent Volodymyr Zelensky. While Ukrainians were once friendly with Moscow, opinion polls show that this is no longer the case. Maintaining a pro-Russian option will require continued force – an occupation that Russia cannot afford.
Moscow may have relied on Zelensky’s unpopularity, not on his rise from comedian to president to a wartime leader, even as opponents rallied behind him. He has had many detractors and has certainly stumbled in the difficult moments of this crisis, but he has now risen to the occasion. With provocatively emotional speeches, Zelensky vows not to leave Kyiv, although he and his family are likely to be Moscow’s prime targets.
Finally, there is the question of timing. The Ukrainians are likely to fight for as long as they have, as they have little choice. They would receive financial and military support, even if the West was reluctant on the ground to boot. Russia isn’t fragile at all, but it has limited resources, an already stagnant economy that is now under attack from Western sanctions, and a population that, despite official opinion polls, probably doesn’t support this war. . The Russian aristocracy is watching wealth fall.
Vladimir Putin may very well take Kyiv. He will definitely get volatility – he already has. But can that turn Ukraine into a loyal neighbor and buffer in need? It seems far more difficult.
Clara Ferreira Marx is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and editorial board member covering commodities and environmental, social and governance issues
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