Saudi Arabia is reconciling with regimes it once tried to topple

Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has spent tens of billions of dollars to overthrow two unfriendly regimes: mr asadand that Houthis, a Shiite rebel group that controls much of Yemen. In the coming months it will probably admit that both efforts have failed. It is not because the Saudis have developed an affinity for their enemies. Rather it is another sign of how Saudi, like some of its Gulf neighbors, increasingly views the rest of the Arab world as a tiresome nuisance.

The Saudis were early supporters of the rebellion against Mr Assad. He began sending arms and money to Syrian rebels in 2012. The insurgency would, of course, end in defeat: the light weapons from the Gulf and the West could not match the large investments by Iran and later Russia. But even after Mr. Assad’s pyrrhic victory, the Saudis (along with Qatar) refused to restore ties with him, or allow him to resume his place in the Arab League, which led to Syria’s annexation in 2011. was suspended.

They are not so stubborn anymore. Prince Faisal said in Munich what other Gulf diplomats say privately: There is no longer a clear path to Mr. Assad’s removal. “We all have policies, but we don’t have any strategy to implement that policy,” he said.

Diplomats feel the state may announce relations with Syria At the next Arab League summit, which is usually held in March (and will be hosted by the Saudis this year). An official of the Ministry of External Affairs says that conditions will be attached to it. For example, Mr. Assad is expected to distance himself from his Iranian patrons, something they may agree to in principle, but not in practice.

The warm-up for Mr. Assad will pale in comparison to the face that may be looming over Yemen. The country has been in turmoil since a 2011 uprising against its longtime dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh. His replacement, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, was a vacant suit who proved unable to hold the country together. This left a void, eagerly filled by the Houthis, who have fought the insurgency since the late 1990s.

In late 2014 they marched on the capital Sanaa and then on Hodeida, the main port on the Red Sea. By March 2015, they had reached the southern city of Aden. Mr. Hadi fled on a boat. This prompted the Saudis to intervene at the head of an Arab coalition. Operation Decisive Storm, as it was called, dragged on for eight inconclusive years and plunged Yemen into a humanitarian crisis. An estimated 19 million Yemenis need food aid to survive; Three-fourths of the people live below the poverty line.

It has proved costly for the Saudis as well. There are no official figures, but the empire spent billions of dollars on the war. Some put the tab as high as $1bn a week in the heaviest fighting period.

The Saudis are negotiating a deal that would allow them to withdraw. It will not remove the Houthis from power, nor bring an end to Yemen’s protracted internal civil war. But it will assure them that the Houthis will stop lobbing drones and missiles across the border into Saudi Arabia. “It gives the Houthis much more than they imagined,” says a desperate Yemeni observer. It could be signed in the coming months – perhaps around the holiday of Ramadan in the holy city of Mecca, which begins in late March this year.

Ask Gulf diplomats about their foreign-policy priorities for the coming years, and they offer high-minded lists that wouldn’t be out of place in a Scandinavian embassy: economic ties with developing countries, large foreign aid programs, joining efforts to fight climate change. When they talk about their Arab neighbors – and they often prefer not to do so – they describe the region as a burden.

Frustrated by Lebanon’s endemic corruption, the Saudis have cut off funding for their traditional clients. They are reluctant to pour more money into Egypt, which is now grappling with its second economic crash since 2016: it seems a bottomless pit of need. They could offer an incentive for Tunisia, which is mired in its own debt crisis – but only because the price tag (perhaps $1bn or so), relatively speaking, isn’t that huge.

Restoring relations with Mr. Assad does not mean that the Saudis will pour money into rebuilding their ruined country. Nor does ending their war in Yemen mean they will do much for the reconstruction effort, which the World Bank estimates will require $25 billion. Taking a page from former President Donald Trump, many Saudis, including officials, are calling this the era of “Saudi First,” a time to spend money at home and cut back on foreign entanglements — especially failed ones.

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