DBangladesh Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus made some comments about the north -east of India. Yunus’s claim attracted a strange relationship between the northeastern states of India, Dhaka served as the mentor of the ocean for the region, and the expansion of the Chinese economy. Although there was a lack of coherence in his statements, he highlighted India’s weaknesses, especially about strategically important Siliguri corridors.
Such comments have provoked a strong response from India, historically maintained a friendly relationship with Bangladesh. However, not now.
Yunse made these comments in China, where there was no Indian representation, at a time when bilateral relations between New Delhi and Dhaka since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 are their lowest. The political scenario in Bangladesh has been transferred since the fall of Sheikh Hasina government, which was long by India. This led to Bangladesh bowed rapidly towards China, which led to India’s strategic concerns about India’s possible instability.
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Initially, the Ministry of External Affairs chose to remain silent in front of these unavoidable comments. However, it takes vengeance soon Withdrawal of transmission facilities For Bangladesh, citing crowds at their ports and airports. In response, National Revenue Board of Bangladesh Suspended the import of yarn Through land ports from India, enhances the tight-for-tat exchange between the two countries.
Snowfall
A narrow strip of land located in West Bengal, the Siliguri Corridor, connects India to its northeastern states. At its narrow point, the corridor is just 22 km wide, which is from Nepal and Bhutan to north and Bangladesh south. This geographical configuration has earned it a monicor “chicken neck”, which highlights its strategic importance.
The Siliguri corridor is important for land trade between the northeastern India and the rest of the country, which has only one railway line goods transport facility. Given its strategic importance, any disruption in this corridor can have a serious impact for the northeastern states of India.
Accurately eight years ago, the deadlock of the Indo-China border in Doklam underlined the vulnerability of the Siliguri corridor. When India intervened to prevent Chinese road construction in the disputed Doklam region, this deadlock arose, which India considers part of Bhutan. The ongoing tensions have increased military readiness on both sides, in which Chinese construction efforts are on in the area. Incidentally, the Doklam Plateau is located at the intersection of Bhutan, Bharat (Sikkim) and Tibet.
As a result, India has extended security measures around the Siliguri Corridor, deploying various security forces, including the Border Security Force (BSF), Sahastra Border Children (SSB), and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).
In the years after the 2017 Doklam Standoff, China has established a range of villages in the mountainous regions claimed by Bhutan, making the situation more complex. These developments have taken place with the disposal of individuals encouraged by the Chinese government, mainly from Tibet. The construction of these villages has expressed concern about China’s long -term intentions in the region and strategy to increase impact on disputed areas.
There is no immediate threat from Bangladesh’s China inclination. But this underlines India’s need to prepare for the possible implications of geopolitical stress in the region.
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Prepare for two scenarios
A landscape remains the possibility of an all-out war, either Bangladesh or China should attempt to cut the railway link connecting India to its northeastern states through the Siliguri Corridor. Such an act will be considered as a declaration of war by India, a strong response warrant. However, the possibility of a full -scale conflict remains low, as it is not in the interests of China or Bangladesh to engage in a war with India, especially with the line of real control (LAC), recent efforts on dissolution and strategic generalization.
A more admirable landscape involves the “gray zone” instability, through which China will increase pressure with its circumference. This has been China’s long -standing strategy, and it becomes even more complicated when considering the position of Bhutan. Bhutan, who has its own border disputes with China, has recently shown signs of entangling with Beijing directly despite India’s historical role.
The border dispute between Bhutan and China mainly revolves around two regions: the northeastern side of Bhutan, and the Doklam Plateau and Jhapreeri Ridge in the west. The latter is particularly important, as it is located at a strategic three-junction between China, Bhutan and India. However, the border discussion between Beijing and Thimpu has expressed concern about the ability of an agreement that may favor China on Bhutan’s expense.
Geo -political analysts estimate that Bhutan may secretly agree to a border disposal with China, which will not only give China access to the Doklam plateau, but will also increase India’s insecurities about the Siliguri corridor. In addition to the construction of artificial villages, China has actively increased the military infrastructure in the region to maintain pressure.
Therefore, the possibility of increased gray zone stress is important if Bhutan had to accept Chinese demands about Doklam.
The approach of June 2025, eight years after the Doklam crisis, is important to assure the dynamics of modern hybrid wars around the strategic land choke.
Typically, it is a maritime chokepuint that attracts the most attention, given how heavy country the country depends on the sea-prophet for business. Now, the land corridors in the neighborhood that have been rapidly weakened as the cinemas of the hybrid war. One such example is a case study of Suvalki Gap, a narrow strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, which suffered from unprecedented hybrid attacks in 2022 after the Russia-Ukraine War.
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Suvalki gap example
Only 65 km long, the Suvalki gap, has a lot of strategic significance due to its geographical location. It acts as an important land corridor for NATO, connecting Poland to Baltic states. The gaps are bound by the Russian excluded Kalinigrad’s excluded and Belarus in the east, a major military ally of Russia.
Russia’s possibility of cutting the land route between Poland and weak Baltic states, similar to the India-China case, remains a real but distant possibility.
It is noteworthy that Polish-Lithuanian border areas are not very favorable for transferring heavy brigade, but are ideal for hybrid activities.
What really makes the Suvalki gap weak today, there are increased hybrid attacks from Russia, which are disastrously unstable, but remain below the threshold of an all-out war. European countries, however, are constantly increasing their investment in dealing with gray zone attacks.
Although the fact is not denied that the regional rivalry in South Asia is a fundamental difference from the Eastern European theater, it becomes mandatory for India to take indications for better preparation against hybrid attacks.
From the point of view of India, an overhaall military principle that highlights active measures against cyber-halls, disintegration and electronic war capabilities is important to prepare against tomorrow’s shadow wars.
Beijing can avoid a full-scale war with India due to its own commercial interests and cross-strategies, but its rapidly growing cyber capabilities require an active readiness from the side of New Delhi-especially where India’s strategic weaknesses are at their highest level. An undeseric support in Bangladesh is China’s inclination, and a growing possibility that Bhutan may resolve border disputes with China, perhaps on the latter side in Doklam. It is a high time that New Delhi is doubled on many colors of gray in offing, even if an all-out war is unlikely.
Swasti Rao Theprint has a consulting editor and a foreign policy specialist. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)