TeaThat story could have been straight out of science fiction – scientists have grown human brain cells in a lab, and taught them to play video games. Pong, similar to squash or tennis. But this did not happen on the big screen. occurred in a lab in MelbourneAustralia, and this raises the fundamental question of the legal status of these so-called neural networks.
Are they the property of the team that created them, or do they deserve some kind of special status – or even authority?
The reason this question is asked is that the ability to play pong may be a sign that these lab-grown brain cells have acquired consciousness – Often defined as the ability to perceive and respond to a world that is outside of you. and there is widespread agreement that sensibility is an important threshold moral position, Moralists believe that sentient beings are capable of having the moral authority not to be treated badly, and have an awareness of the implications of emotion. fast embedded In research practices involving animals.
If Melbourne neurons are sensitive, this could mean that they are capable of suffering – perhaps through feeling pain or other avoidable discomfort. Since there is a broad moral consensus that we should not inflict unnecessary suffering, this may mean that there are ethical limits to what we can do with these neural networks.
It is worth saying that the team that created the cells don’t think they’re there yet Since the closed system in which the experiment took place means that, even if we accept that neurons are responding to external stimuli, we do not know whether they are doing so intentionally and with the understanding that some of their actions How can the results be
But given where we are, it’s not beyond the realm of possibility that sentiment could be the next milestone. And if that’s true, it’s not just ethicists who should be paying attention – legislators should keep a close eye on this technique, too.
legal problem
This is because, since Roman times, the law classified everything as a person or property. Legal persons are able to bear the rights. Conversely, property is something that is incapable of bearing rights. So if we think that our neural networks may soon have moral status, and this should be reflected in legal protections, then we will need to recognize that they were no longer assets – but legal persons. And the case of Happy, an elephant at the Bronx Zoo, who campaigners wanted to relocate to the elephant sanctuary, shows us why this is something we should be proactive about.
New York courts were recently asked whether Happy had a right to liberty, and they said no – because she was not a legal person. full details of the case Here, but for our purposes, the important takeaway from the decision is this: The courts recognized that Happy was a moral being deserving of the protection of rights, but powerless to act. This was because changing his legal status from property to person was a big change for him. Instead, it was a job for the legislature – who are choosing not to do anything.
By recognizing a moral claim they cannot enforce, courts – and the law more generally – accept what is an injustice. This is especially shocking when you consider that the term “legal person” does not mean the same thing as “human”. throughout history and in legal systems around the world we have seen temples, statues, ships, Corporation and also rivers classified as legal persons. Instead, it is just an indicator that the carrier is capable of having legal rights.
The lesson we can take from this is that we need to future proof the law. It is better to be proactive to avoid a potential problem than to try and catch it when it has already happened.
And as we said above – with respect to Melbourne neurons this problem is observable from afar. Even though they are not yet sentient, the potential is there – and so it is something we should take seriously. Because if we recognize that these networks are sensitive, and therefore have an ethical position, it is desirable that the law reflect this and provide protection commensurate with their interests.
This is not a revolutionary claim, and we have been in a similar situation before. When IVF technology first emerged in the 1980s, the law first faced the question of the legal status of in-vitro embryos. An inquiry was convened to examine the ethical questions raised by this new technology, culminating in the following recommendations. warning report, These recommendations formed the basis of the UK’s legislative framework around IVF, which creates a sort of “third status” for these embryos – not absolute legal persons, but on what can be done with them because of their moral status. important restriction.
The effects of the Warnock Report are still visible today – so there is no reason why a similar approach could not be taken in relation to the issues raised in Melbourne. Yes, there are a lot of unanswered questions about the capabilities of these neural networks and we can very well conclude that they just don’t deserve legal protection.
But there are certainly enough questions surrounding this technology to try to find an answer.
Joshua JovittLecturer in Law, Newcastle University
This article is republished from Conversation Under Creative Commons license. read the original article,
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