India and China are moving towards a new method of dispute to maintain peace and tranquility along their disputed 4,000-km border. In 2020, the old arrangement shaped by the agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 fell apart in Ladakh when the Chinese military in Tibet imposed blockades at six points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to contain Indian troops. From patrolling the border.
A Clash in Galwan in June 2020 The first such loss on the LAC after 1975 led to the death of 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers. Sino-Indian conflict, in December 2022In the Yangtse, northeast of Tawang, suggests new measures may be needed across the LAC, not just in Ladakh.
Efforts to reduce tension on the border
Important discussions are reported to have taken place between Shilpak Ambule, Joint Secretary of the East Asia Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Office of the External Affairs Minister, and Hong Liang, Director General of the Border Department. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China for Ocean Affairs met in Beijing 26th Meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India Border Affairs (WMCC)On February 22, 2023. This was the first face-to-face meeting of the WMCC, which had held the previous 11 rounds since the 2020 events by video conference.
Over the past three years, through patient negotiations, both sides managed to disengage from four of the six points – Galwan, Pangong Tso, Gogra Post and Jiannan Pass (PP15). But the Depsang Bulge and the Charing Ninglung Junction in the Demchok area, which is spread over about 1,000 square kilometres, are two major areas of unrest.
An Indian press release after the meeting said that proposals for disengagement in “remaining areas” were discussed “in an open and constructive manner” that “could create conditions for restoration of normalcy in bilateral relations”.
The Chinese release, which was a bit more forthcoming, spoke of “achievements made in disengagement of border troops of the two countries at four places, including the Galwan Valley” and that the two sides would work along “established lines” and resolve remaining issues. on the western border. But, more importantly, it said that “the two sides discussed other measures to further ease the border situation, and agreed to make efforts to promote the border situation to the stage of general management and control”.
What could be these “other measures” that could restore a measure of normality to a situation badly affected by the events of 2020?
While several proposals have been discussed, the most likely one (based on the experience of the last three years) is about converting other parts of the LAC into similar non-patrol zones. Soon thereafter, a package deal could be done in the two remaining areas of Depsang and Charding Nala. The discussions also reportedly raised the issue of upgrading border management, which would mean replacing the WMCC with a system that would have both military and civilian officials.
The entire series of confidence-building measures since 1993 was based on the belief that both sides largely accepted the establishment of the LAC, though they had differences that pertained to some 18-20 points on it. The 1993 and 1996 agreements specifically spoke of the importance of recognizing and resolving these differences. But as the decade wore on, the Chinese shied away from defining a clear LAC without giving any concrete reason; This resulted in Indian and Chinese patrols sometimes resorting to pushing, shoving and even scuffles and stone pelting. And then there was 2020.
on no-patrol areas
It is likely that the no-patrol zones may be limited to places where both sides have overlapping claims. As of 2020, both sides patrolled the border of these conflicting claims and there was a protocol that if the two patrols met, they would stop and display banners asking the other side to return to their territory. Thereafter, the issue was settled through meetings at one of the five designated border meeting points.
In an article in an Indian publication in 2020, Chinese journalist-scholar Qian Feng suggested that the concept of “zone of actual control” may replace the “Line of Actual Control” in some areas that have no clear geomorphological features or features. There was no population. Other areas may also be demarcated as “border areas” if they do not require population adjustments. But whether this idea works or not will depend on the intention of both the interlocutors. If China wants to use the LAC’s lack of precision to keep India off balance, little will change.
The idea is actually an echo of the original proposal by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, similar to what we are experiencing today. In October 1959, an Indian police party was ambushed at Kongka La, killing 10 personnel and capturing a dozen.
An uproar ensued, and to quell it, Zhou proposed in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, dated November 7, 1959, that both sides withdraw 20 kilometers to the “so-called” McMahon Line, as well as “each side west to the line”. In Exercise Control”.
shifting the goalposts
Just at what point the Chinese exercised “control to the west” at that time, or even now, has never been clear as no detailed maps have ever been made available. And this has been at the root of the problem. Over the years, the Chinese have been able to change goalposts at will, especially with regard to the Ladakh border.
Despite tensions, Indian and Chinese ministers and officials have been meeting each other regularly; External Affairs Minister of India S Jaishankar met his Chinese counterpart Qin Gang On the sidelines of the G-20 foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi earlier this month.
In March 2022, Mr. Qin’s predecessor, Wang Yi visited New DelhiApparently to discuss issues related to Ukraine. In his meetings with Mr. Wang, Mr. Jaishankar emphasized that there can be no normalization of India-China relations until the situation in eastern Ladakh is resolved. Last week, he said that China’s inability to fulfill what was agreed between the two sides in 2020 has made their relationship “fragile” and “very dangerous”.
In 2014 and 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tried his level best to persuade the Chinese to clarify the LAC on points where there were differences. The Chinese ignored his offers. The events of 2020 have eroded the trust that was patiently built between 1993 and 2020. The range of commonality in China-India relations is now very high.
Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and author Understanding the India-China Border: The Perpetual Threat of War in the High Himalayas