historical context
In 1947, India was capable of maintaining control over the Srinagar airspace by its teeth skin. Thanks to the attempts of bravery by 1 Sikh under the competent command of Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai and Dakotas from the Indian Air Force number 12 squadron, India was able to refund the marding crowd of Pakistani militia, which proceeded within 30 mi of Airfield. Subsequently, in the wars of 1965 and 1971, Srinagar received frequent trips from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
In particular, on 14 December 1971, IAF’s only Paramer Veer Chakra was awarded Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon for his fearless bravery in air action at Srinagar.
It was a very firm attack, and the PAF was ready to take maximum risk. However, despite these attacks, the Srinagar Airfield remained operational and the IAF military operations continued without thinking. These attacks highlighted Pakistan’s intention to neutralizing the intention of Srinagar’s operational capacity, underlining the need for strong defense strategies in front of the dangers developed.
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Emerging threats
The air operations during India’s Operation Sindoor, which began on 7 May, and Pakistan’s Anti-Representative Operation Banyan-Al-Marsos (May 10) revealed a new paradigm in the air war. Pakistan deployed advanced technologies, with flock drones, anti-radiation missiles (ARM) capabilities with Kamikes drones, long distance long-range standoff weapons beyond 100 km, and beyond a range of more than 200 km, and beyond a range of more than 200 km from-Viguel-range (BVR) missiles.
These systems pose a versatile threat to Srinagar Airfield, making India’s ability to maintain air control complicated.
Geographically, the proximity to the Line of Control (LOC) of Srinagar and the International Border (IB) increases its vulnerability. The LoC sector of URI, BARAMULLA, and Tangdhar is only 60–70 km away, while the IB in Akhanur is 120 km. In Pakistan’s Qadri Airbase Scardu, 160 km from Srinagar, J -10C, F -16 and JF -17 can be given homes to advanced PAF fighters. Closure base, helicopters and drone operations at Kotli and Rawalkot, about 100 km away, can support. In a comprehensive conflict, PAF can deploy property from distant bases, as far as PAF base in Karachi take advantage of long distance weapons to target Masroor, AAR (air-to-air fuel) and Srinagar.
The modern list of PAF, which includes data-linked fighters and saab 2000 reserved early warnings and controls (AEV and C) systems, increases its operational access. A combat air petrol (CAP), IAF can attach the fighters, at a distance of 100–150 km from Srinagar within the Pakistani airspace as they are closed, especially when they clean the crest line of the surrounding area. When they are the weakest. Beyond the Visual Range (BVR) missiles, with a range of more than 200 km, enables the PAF to neutralize air threats, before they achieve height or can effectively maneuver to get into a profitable position.
Additionally, herds with anti-radiation missiles (ARM) features can target drones and kamikes drone radar and air defense systems, while surface-launched missiles and further revered artillery endanger the infrastructure of the airfield. A saturation strike, combining these elements, can disable the runway or important features for hours, disrupt the IAF operation at a significant turn.
The attack of 10 May 10, while symbolic, was limited in scale. Future PAF operations, potentially coordinated with ground maneuvers from Pakistan -occupied Kashmir (PoK) or Akhnoor bulge may include a big, more continuous attack. Such a scenario would test India’s defensive abilities, especially if Pakistan employs a combination of pre-strips and frequent air threats, which promotes the rescue of Srinagar.
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Srinagar rescue
Defending Srinagar Airfield against these emerging hazards require to address a complex array of challenges: slow drones, suicide drones, weapons, air-to-air missiles, long distance artillery and exactly aerial weapons. The proximity of the airfield for hostile bases and enemy airspieces makes it unsafe for deadlock attacks, requiring revaluation of traditional air defense strategies. A saturation strike can temporarily disable the runway, grounding the IAF fighters, while a BVR-Sastra PAF can attempt to launch a PAF cap littering aircraft within the Kill range. Both landscapes reduce India’s ability to maintain air superiority on Srinagar, which is a foundation stone of our aerial strategy.
India’s current air defense currency in the region depends on maintaining the “Guns Tight” protocol, where surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air defense weapons are attached only after clearance to avoid fartricide. This cautious approach, while the blue-on-blue (friendly fire) is required to prevent phenomena, limits the accountability of a flock-based defense against rapidly developed dangers such as herds or low-ravages. In addition, deploying IAF fighters from Srinagar is rapidly uncertain, as PAF’s AEW & C and BVR capabilities can detect and attach the aircraft immediately after the take-off.
Pakistan’s recent attack, though unsuccessful due to significant losses, can be exploited in a large -scale operation. Pakistan’s desire to take maximum risk, as displayed in Operation Banyan-al-Marsos, suggests that saturation and coordination can be preferred to increase prevention from future attacks. IAF cannot assume that Srinagar’s operational flexibility will be against a more prescribed attack, especially in the context of a theater-wide struggle.
This is a fact that, depending on our own abilities, we can cause similar problems for the other side. However, this analysis focuses on the challenges of defending the Srinagar and Kashmir Valley.
Strength versus vulnerability
To compete with these dangers, India can take advantage of its strength against Pakistan’s weaknesses by adopting an aerial refusal. strategy On the traditional discovery of air superiority. India’s ground-based Air Defense Infrastructure, Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACS) and Akashtier to detect, and for engagement S-400, Barak-8 and Akash Sam provides integrated air command and control system (IACS) and Akashtier, and Akashtier provides a malignant foundation.
The S-400, with an identity limit of 600 km and an effective kiln of up to 400 km, can attach the target well beyond deep IB/ LoC in Pakistan airspace. Medium/small range SAMS and air defense guns can provide additional layers of safety. By transferring “gun-free” to default mode instead of “gun tight”, India can create a no-fly zone extending up to 400 km from Srinagar, allowing it to be prohibited for the operation of PAF aircraft, even within its own aircraft.
The strategy of this air denial will include the IAF fighters on the ground scattered within the Srinagar Airfield, which are placed in rigid aircraft shelters (are), or will transfer them to nearby bases. When necessary, IAF fighters equipped with long -range BVR missiles, supported by airborne warnings and control systems (AWACS), can work from other bases to provide local aerial superiority on Srinagar, without exposing themselves to direct attack on the ground. This approach maximizes the freedom of engagement for ground-based defense, allowing SAM and guns to independently attach any aerial threat within the range, regardless of the origin of the danger.
The air refusal strategy exploited Pakistan’s dependence on Airborne platforms to target Srinagar, making them extremely weak for the formidable air defense architecture on the ground. This will stop the PAF, and whether they should have a desire to press the house, they will have to spend important additional resources to enter the airspace. The psychological and operating effects of such a strategy may disrupt the PAF’s plan, as the risk of heavy losses is ahead of the potential profit.
For an Air Force, under the leadership of fighter pilots, which worships on the altar of air superiority, it will be a bitter pill to swallow. After being one itself, I think we consider maintaining and maintaining air control as the role of primary airpower. For IAF, air is superiority Primus inter pares,
The strategy of air denial may look like a defensive step.
Historical predecessor
Air denial strategy takes inspiration from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Egyptian forces established a dense air defense network with the Suez Canal, denied the Israeli Air Force operational freedom. While Israel eventually achieved air superiority, it did so at an important cost in blood and treasures despite enjoying an important technical advantage on Egypt. Pakistan, India’s advanced air defense systems lack a uniform edge, a stator faces a challenge. India’s S-400, Akashteer, and IACCs provide a strong detection and engagement ability, making an air refusal strategy.
For IAF, a culture is immersed in a culture that preference air superiority, it may seem defeated to refuse air. Air superiority, often considered the primary role of airpower, ensures the control of the sky for aggressive and defensive operation. However, in the unique context of Srinagar – literaryly constrained, close to hostile bases, and facing advanced threats – air denial offers a practical option.
PAF’s ability to work anywhere near Srinagar can maintain operating continuity in the airfield, without depending on fighter aircraft to the operational readiness platform (ORP) or to be aerial as part of a nearby hat from Srinagar.
Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Rtiad) is a former IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @ahlawat2012. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)