Caste demographics do not have the deterministic effect on electoral outcomes that is often assumed
As the new phase of state elections in India is approaching, political parties are preparing their election strategies. A large part of this exercise includes mapping the constituency, or collecting data about caste and community demographics, information about the local balance of power between groups, and the identification of local caste leaders, with a particular reading of candidates. The selection is for the purpose of matching. About the socio-political characteristics of each seat.
as a political variable
These caste-based strategies also involve large-scale equalization, in which parties target their discourse to specific segments of the electorate, which are again defined on the basis of caste. In recent months, we have seen the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) increasing gestures towards Brahmin communities, hoping to bank on the outrage generated by an openly pro-Rajput administration.
Both practices – micro- and macro-caste targeting – have been used for a long time in Indian politics, and particularly in Uttar Pradesh. The incentives for parties and candidates to look at voters through the prism of caste are clear: caste makes a complex social and political scene readable. It simplifies things. It prevents parties from addressing individual aspirations on the basis of their responsible identity, by linking them to collective aspirations.
But reading politics or voters specifically through the lens of caste leads to many over-simplifications and misconceptions about the way caste works as a political variable.
For example, much is made about caste voting and the alignment of caste and party. Pre-election and post-election surveys attempt to examine the electoral behavior of large groups taken as a whole. In fact, the majority of voters in Uttar Pradesh do not belong to groups that are firmly associated with any party. Caste politics is not the game of few but of many. Most castes are too small or too geographically dispersed, or too poor to form a main support base for any party or candidate, even at the local level.
findings of a survey
As a result, only certain groups vote unitedly for specific parties, such as Jatavs for BSP, Yadavs for SP, upper castes with Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), etc. And yet, the extent of cohesion of these groups in support of the parties they wish to represent varies greatly over time. According to data from the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)/Lokniti Survey, since 2007, Jatavs and Yadavs’ support for the BSP and SP has waned. Data from the same survey shows that with the growing rift among Yadavs along the class line, richer Yadavs are more likely to vote for the BJP. Over the past 30 years, upper caste voters have not always unitedly supported the BJP and neither have the large numbers of smaller, non-dominant Other Backward Classes and Dalit groups that form the second center of its electoral base in Uttar Pradesh today.
Available data on how people vote suggests an absence of caste-based block voting and instead shows caste-party alignments that are loose, and fluctuate over time.
micro targeting strategy
Since 2014, the BJP has successfully developed a strategy based on micro-targeting of small groups. To achieve this, it has used a mobilization approach or a combination of registers that include caste appeals, through the organization of minor caste fairs, the inclusion of non-dominant OBC leaders within the party, and small caste/community groups. Sponsoring events, and so forth. It also uses the rhetoric of inclusion and justice by claiming to be non-discriminatory in the distribution and provision of public goods and welfare benefits. In the process, they portray their opponents as elitist political parties that prefer their core support base. Finally, they also use religion and nationalism as mobilization tools to bind together sections of the electorate that generally have little interest, including the upper castes. In this way the BJP has been able to forge a social coalition of groups that include both the traditional upper-caste elite and the non-dominant backward groups.
In this context, caste does not lose its importance, but is part of a strategy that uses a variety of discourses to mobilize voters. The caste arithmetic matters, but in itself is insufficient to win elections. For example, caste considerations will still largely determine the distribution of tickets, which, in turn, will shape the representation of different groups in the state legislature. But it does not account for the complexity of voters’ electoral behavior, nor the overall party appeal or campaign influences.
bastions and seats
Another indicator of the fluctuating linkage between caste and politics is the relatively small number of caste strongholds, defined as seats that regularly return legislators who may be from different parties but a belong to the same caste.
In 2017, 319 seats changed hands in the case of the party, due to the strong performance of the BJP, which won 272 of these (it retained 40 of the 47 seats it won in 2012). Of these 319 seats, only 74 elected an MLA from the same caste in 2012. Overall, the caste retention of seats in the Legislative Assembly of 403 There were 34% (139 MLAs), which includes re-elected MLAs and new MLAs from the same or different parties.
Even before the 2007 delimitation, the number of caste strongholds was quite limited. Between 1996 and 2007, voters elected legislators from the same caste in only 94 consecutive seats (28 of which were won by the same party in three elections). This fact alone, combined with an overall high electoral instability, indicates that caste demographics do not have the deterministic effect on electoral outcomes that is often assumed.
Caste-based strategies are also more likely to be effective when the voter and party systems are highly fragmented. Parties may seek to form a minimum caste coalition at the constituency level to obtain the minimum number of votes required to secure seats. Prior to 2017, the average vote share or winning threshold of winners was around 35%.
This benefited regional parties, which could combine the strength of their core support base with the votes that candidates from other castes could bring on their own. This was known as vote bank transferability.
Uttar Pradesh, 2012 onwards
But after 2012, the rise of the BJP reduced the fragmentation of the party system, which meant that the threshold of victory rose further. In 2017, the winners had an average vote share of 43%, up from 35% in 2012. In such a context, strategies that rely mostly on caste arithmetic become insufficient, as it is very difficult to mobilize multiple castes at the same time in fragmented constituencies. .
This explains why the BJP holds a considerable advantage against its opponents. Beyond the question of resources and organizational strength, the BJP developed the ability to reach a wide range of groups using multiple registers of mobilization, including caste, religion, nationalism, welfare, and an anti-elitist discourse targeting its opponents. Is.
In contrast, BSP and SP relied on strategies that helped them secure majority in 2007 and 2012, but it proved ineffective to counter BJP’s dominance in the last three elections (2014, 2017 and 2019) Is. The future will tell whether these parties can restart their electoral strategies. One thing is certain for them at this time that time is running out.
Gilles Verniers is an assistant professor of political science and co-director of the Trivedi Center for Political Data, Ashoka University. Views expressed are personal
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