“What kind of global power will India be?” There are those who argue that India should aspire to become a great power and assert its growing power internationally; Others argue that India should focus on lifting millions of its people above the poverty line, improving governance, and bringing harmony within the country before taking steps towards making the world a better place.
This is a false binary. Despite the (equally flawed) hyper-nationalist and deeply-pessimistic narratives, the story of India’s rise and its associated challenges must be actively and seriously considered – because the kind of power India will become will not only define the future of the world in important ways, but will, of course, shape the fate of its 1.4 billion (and growing) citizens.
Ignoring or dismissing the global consequences of India’s rising power is unwise, but to do so without regard to the realities of the country’s inherent borders would be a strategic mistake.
power and its consequences
Let’s start with India in 1991 – a weak, poor and deeply troubled country with foreign exchange reserves of $5.8 billion and a nominal GDP of $270.11 billion. For a population of 846 million, of whom nearly 50% were poor, these were pitiful figures. Despite efforts to allay fears of nuclear war, the prospect of an Indo-Pakistani conflict loomed large and violence in Kashmir was at its peak. The collapse of India’s trusted partner, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and strained relations with the United States, on the other, put further pressure on the country’s ruling elite. American officials kept a close eye on India and Pakistan and their nuclear plans, and sometimes traveled to the subcontinent to advise the warring neighbors.
Fast forward three decades to 2023. India’s foreign exchange reserves have swelled to nearly $600 billion, and a war with Pakistan is not something that gives Indian politicians sleepless nights – although China has taken that position – and there is a general sense of optimism in foreign policy. The reforms initiated after the economic crisis of 1991 not only resulted in high GDP growth but also marked reduction in poverty.
India’s nominal GDP, ranked as the world’s fifth largest economy, may soon reach $4 trillion; It is one of the largest armies in the world with more than a hundred nuclear warheads. The US is now one of India’s closest friends, and New Delhi has strong ties with many powerful states around the world. The visionary investments made over the past several decades are now bearing fruits with a favorable external environment for the upliftment of the country.
India is also one of the defining forces of the contemporary international system, strategically located, and often playing both sides with great gusto. Great power politics surrounding the Ukraine war brought a renewed focus on India’s role in world politics. America and the rich West want India to be on their side. The beleaguered Russian Federation is making every effort to ensure that India does not turn its back on Moscow. There are serious suggestions that India should mediate between Ukraine and Russia to end the war.
New Delhi is increasingly using the language of mediation in global crises and becoming a bridge between North and South and East and West, indirectly indicating that it is a major ‘pole’ in world politics. Although hundreds of millions of people in India still live in poverty, the country’s national power has increased dramatically, making it a force with system-shaping capabilities and will. Whether New Delhi is really punching above its weight or not, only time will tell.
The other side of the great power story
Despite being the world’s fifth largest economy, its per capita GDP in 2021 was $1,947, compared to Bangladesh’s $2,227, higher than India’s, even though Bangladesh has only the world’s 40th largest army. The logic of this comparison is well known: GDP and military strength do not equate to the well-being of a country’s citizens. But at the same time, the well-being of a country’s population is not equivalent to the gross material power that a state can bring to its foreign and security policies.
India is also beset by major infrastructural and governance issues: ease of doing business may be improving, but starting a business without kickbacks is still not easy. Every year, a few days of rain bring the national capital to its knees. Regional, caste, ethnic and religious divisions run deep. India’s domestic challenges will continue to distract its political leaders from global problems. For the Indian politician, foreign policy is a luxury he cannot afford.
One of the most important concerns for India’s political class is reducing poverty and improving the well-being of millions of Indians living below the poverty line, a task that would distract it from serious external preoccupations. When the political class pays little attention to the country’s foreign and security policy, as is usually the case with India, it is managed by career bureaucrats who usually do not deviate from precedents and avoid making far-fetched, risky decisions. Without political will, foreign policy tends to be on autopilot.
The presence of a weak economy also reduces the appetite of the Indian elite for outside involvement. Over time, hunger has grown, but that doesn’t change the fact that the political class can only pay so much attention to foreign and security policies if the country is economically weak and large sections of the population are living in poverty.
Furthermore, a weak domestic economy prevents politicians from allocating sufficient resources to foreign policy objectives. For example, the Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs (2022-23) found that “despite an increase in the overall budget allocation of the Government of India, the allocation to the Ministry of External Affairs [the Ministry of External Affairs] There has been a decline in percentage terms during the last four years and it is only 0.44% of the total budget of the Government of India during 2022-23. The committee further said that we “do not find such allocation commensurate with the growing aspirations and growing global stature of the country”. Perhaps the country is incapable of doing so.
The combined effect of such domestic challenges is likely to distract political elites from more immediate domestic considerations rather than the grandeur of great power status.
embrace the power
So, should India refrain from shaping the global order until its domestic challenges are resolved, as pessimists believe? Or should India maintain its place in the world and aspire to become a great power?
Even though India’s domestic inefficiencies will continue to limit its ability to influence the world order commensurate with its size and ambition, it would be a strategic mistake to be reluctant to engage and shape it. If you are not a rule maker, you are a rule taker. India has no choice but to influence and shape the global order to meet its foreign policy objectives, which will have significant implications for its economic development, security environment, and geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Be it debt restructuring, climate change, global trade or nuclear non-proliferation, New Delhi cannot allow anyone else to make the rules and follow them. Whether it likes it or not, India’s influence on the world order is a certainty, and, in a globalized world, the relationship between a state’s global influence and domestic growth is inevitable.
India’s ability to shape international politics must also be a reflection of its domestic context, and its global engagement must necessarily be for the good of its people. Neither strategic autocracy is an option nor is India’s assertiveness on the global stage a matter of nationalistic arrogance or official hubris.
Happyman teaches at the Jacob School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research.