The Fund Cauvery Engine Campaign is more than a hashtag. India needs control over its fighter jets

TeaThat “Fund Cauvery Engine” campaign is currently trending on X. The hashtag is being promoted by aviation enthusiastic, defense reporters, strategic experts and some popular data on social media. In the heart of the campaign it is understandable that our current aerospace dreams, especially in relation to developing a modern contemporary fighter aircraft, are hostage for foreign engine suppliers.

Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) MK-1A has already delayed more than two years for the GE F404-EN20 engines for the GE F404-Indian engines from the General Electric (GE) aerospace, and there is a possibility of more delay. The GE has cited the lack of supply chain, including the disruption and lack of significant components due to the Kovid -19 epidemic, as the causes of the delay. It has also stated part of the defect against us that the delay was mainly due to orders of delays from India. Since the GE’s F404 production line was inactive for many years, the process of re -activating it takes a lot of time and resources.

This article delays the timeline, financial investment, current situation, hurdles of the Cauvery program, and evaluates whether it is a better way to co-create a new engine with an established original tool manufacturer (OEM) or pursue an independent program.

Timeline

The Cauvery Engine Project was launched in 1989 by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) under the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which aims to provide strength to light combat aircraft (LCA) with a indigenous low-bipas turbofan engine, which distributes 80 KN three0 KN three0 KN three0 KN. The development of the “Kabini” core module was seen in the early 1990s, with the first prototype in 1995 and all the five ground-test prototypes tested by 1998. Flight tests were planned for 1999, and integration in Tejas Airframe was planned for 2000. However, 1998 Pokharan Nuclear Testing Trials International Complex, Limiting International Complex.

Meanwhile, LCA resumed as Tejas, making its first flight in January 2001. Tejas was powered by the GE 404 engine.

In 2004, the first high -height tests in Russia detected some shortcomings, which ended the hopes of equipping the first production version of the Tejas aircraft with the Kiveri engine. In 2005, it was decided to buy a 40 GE F404 engine for Tejas. It was also decided to cooperate with France’s SNECMA to resolve issues with Cauvery. However, the conversation with SNECMA collapsed over technology transfer disputes in 2013. In 2008, Cauvery was removed from Tejas due to inability to achieve the necessary performance goals. However, the development of Cauvery by GTRE was allowed to continue for other future applications.

Along with the route, there were some hits and mrs. including Deming Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Report Published in 2011. On the good side, the Cauvery derivative engine (KDE), a non-offerburner (drought) version, was found suitable for Ghatak UAV. Recently, BrahMos Aerospace’s efforts have made significant improvements in the afterburner rule, leading to a wet force. On the sea front, the Kaveri Marine Gas Turbine (KMGT) has been tested for naval applications and found suitable for small warships.

Investment

The Cauvery Engine Project has seen significant financial investment since its approval in 1989. According to the government Press release The dated 29 November 2021, Rs 2,035.5 crore was spent on the Cauvery program against the allocated amount of Rs 2,105 crore on the Kaveri program.

This amount will be around 300 million in USD terms. The exact expenses after the 2021 program are not easily available, however, is going from the progress of the project, it can be safely considered to be approximately $ 400 million.

In isolation, they seem to be a large amount; However, when compared with investment made by other successful engine manufacturers, it is quite low. The Cauvery engine was invested in 35 years with approximately $ 400 million, behind the budget of $ 2–5 billion of Safran, Rolls-Royce and GE. Accurate figures are not easily available, however, no one can estimate the Safran’s 2016 proposal to revive the Cauvery program to invest € 1 billion ($ 1.1 billion in 2016, about $ 1.3 billion in 2016), to estimate investment scale to disclose the scale of funding required for advanced engine development.

Current status

As of May 2025, the Cauvery program has gained slight speed, affected by the increasing awareness between large and large -scale citizenship by campaigns such as “Fund Cauvery Engine”. On 30 April 2025, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh Announced Speaking in a defense industry competition in New Delhi, money increased to accelerate the Cauvery engine program.

The KDE, designed for Ghatak UAV, distributes the APROX 50 Kn and is ready for in-Flight testing in 2025, with a limited chain production plan for 2025-2026. The engine weighs from 1,423.78 kg to 1,180 kg, although it remains above the target of 1,000 kg. KMGT has fulfilled the Navy specifications and is now waiting for the test for complete verification.

Challenges

It is important to study the challenges in detail in the past so that we can address them in future. The issues were largely related to money, content, management, manpower and management expectations.

Wealth: Sporadic and insufficient money deprived the program at the necessary pace.

Material: The restrictions imposed in 1998 banned access to important materials, such as high-demonstrations required for jet engine efficiency. Some of those sanctions were later removed, but the access is banned.

Prankti: Most of our high artists, including IIT graduates, want employment in the West. There was always a challenge to find talent on government salary. In addition to low induction, the rate of efficient manpower was higher.

Management of expectation: The initial expectations of integrating Cauvery with Tejas without intermediate platform testing were very ambitious. More realistic deadlines would emerge if the project leadership considered factors such as the non-availability of the test infrastructure, including a high-height test bed and flight-testing beds. We should have estimated a delay in developing a single-crystal turbine blades and aerotermal systems such as our limited pre-expertise.

Also read: Lesson for airpower from Operation Sindoor – once for technological progress

Ahead

Cauvery experience is a story of a glass that is more than half full. We have developed a functional engine and earned in the process of excess of data points and experience at relatively low cost. The platform is now ready to take advantage of this knowledge for better construction.

However, I would like to add a word of caution here. Kaveri is now a completely mature engine. The possibility of performing performance and weight improving weight, in the same design, is very limited from here. Even if we consider an optimistic landscape, we will get 55 Kn in drought and 85 Kn in wet loud rule. However, we will need an engine that produces 100kn plus for our AMCA and Tejas MK2. We will need to develop a separate engine, which we can call Cauvery 2.0, which addresses a significant decrease in Cauvery 1.0. The lesson learned so far will definitely be useful.

In short, campaign, or call to action, must be: Fund indigenous engine.

In that regard, we will have an option to make: either we develop on our own, or we want external help from existing manufacturers.

Developing an engine of your own provides a clear benefit of complete ownership of intellectual property. We will have strategic flexibility in terms of construction of export and supporting engine applications. Negative side can be measured in terms of time and treasures. It will probably take more than 10–15 years and 2 billion dollars. There is also a possibility of time and cost overran.

Alternatively, we can partner with a proven OEM such as Safran, GE, or Rolls-Royce. The selected OEM can provide access to advanced technologies, such as single-crystal blades, advanced cooling systems and advanced digital engine controls, which we currently have a shortage. In such a scenario, the risk of failure is low, although cost concerns remain. The choice of OEM depends on a lot of factors, including costs, tot degrees, and other strategic concerns. A partnership with OEM such as Safran, which has expressed interest in co-development of 110–130 KN engine for AMCA, can bridge the significant interval in material, testing and manufacturing, allowing India to maintain significant IP rights. Such cooperation can provide production-taira engine within 7-10 years, creating domestic expertise for future independent programs, can align with Tejas MK2 and AMCA’s production deadline.

The bottom line will be the degree of sovereign control, which we will be able to exercise on the finished product in terms of growth, testing, upgradation and sale. As long as the industry partner is unable to reduce our access and the ability to manage our product, as we see fit, it should be acceptable to co-develop an engine with an exotic OEM.

For example, take a case of Tejas. Apart from the engine, there are various systems and sub-secretives that we import for our aircraft (Elta radar, Martin Baker Ejection seat, Cobum Inflite Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel, Russian and Israel-made air-to-air missiles, some avionics, line changed unit (LRUS), and therefore). However, none of these tool suppliers can lead to prolonged grounding of fleet alone or even in concerts. We maintain adequate depth and alternative options, including indigenous options, to tide us on a potential supply restriction. In short, we maintain enough sovereign control over our aircraft, but for the will of an engine, which remains an important dependence.

conclusion

The “Fund Cauvery Engine” campaign has created widespread support among experts as well as awareness and liberation among the concerned citizens. The recent experiences of Operation Sindoor have revealed us the strategic imperative of a strong indigenous defense ecosystem. The requirement of an indigenous aero engine has now become an essential national demand. Political, scientific and military leadership is aware of this important requirement. This mission now needs all we all need to visit a logical conclusion, funding, international cooperation and public pace to see this mission.

Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Rtiad) is a former IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @ahlawat2012. Views are personal.

(Edited by Ratan Priya)