The invasion has stopped, but Putin’s war on dissent continues

Yet Mr Sverdlin was allowed to continue with his job as long as he was not too vocal about the failings of Vladimir Putin’s government. “We tried to heat the cold air outside our comfortable flats. We tried to create a country where the people were independent of the state.” He felt that his efforts were working: “The Russian [civil] The society was growing rapidly. People started thinking not only about themselves, but about their neighbors and what was going on in their streets.”

“Then this bastard started this war and the temperature dropped 300 degrees and probably got colder than it has ever been in the last 70 years.” He was about to be arrested and hence fled the country. “For years I’d been talking about what it was like to be homeless, and suddenly, overnight, I lost my home,” he says.

It is not just Mr. Sverdlin who has lost his place in Russian society. at least 500,000 people have Left country, to avoid conscription because their jobs have been lost, or, like Mr. Sverdlin, to avoid internment. The fear is justified: some 20,000 Russians have been arrested for opposing the war since it began. Police have also detained people for offering flowers to statues of historical figures of Ukrainian origin, as they see the gesture (correctly) as an implied rebuke. Jailed opposition leader Alexey Navalny has been moved Until solitude Prosecutors are preparing a new political show trial for him.

By the same token the few remaining institutions that criticized the government or advocated for a more liberal society have disappeared. A legal ban imposed by Mr Putin’s regime on discussing the war – or even calling for it – has forced the closure of all independent media outlets, including the Echo of Moscow, a radio station and TV Ren, a television channel (both broadcast from now on). outside Russia). The Moscow Helsinki Group, which campaigns for human rights, has been closed. Another such organization, the Andrei Sakharov Center, is being evicted from its premises.

a civil-society war

Daniel Treisman of the University of California argues that these people and institutions are not accidental victims of war, but one of its main targets. After all, Ukraine did not pose any military threat to Russia. And a vast and sparsely populated country, spread across 11 time zones, can hardly be said to need more territory. Rather, it was the gradual emergence of an empowered civil society in Ukraine that successfully demanded state reform, and signs of a similar process in Russia, that Mr. Putin found intimidating.

Before the tanks rolled into Ukraine, Mr. Treisman said, liberal values ​​were spreading rapidly in Russia. Those who told pollsters that freedom of speech was important to them increased from 34% in 2017 to 61% in 2021. Mr Navalny’s YouTube channel was being viewed in record numbers. Meanwhile, television viewing, the government’s main tool for shaping Russians’ attitudes, was in sharp decline.

The change was driven by a generational change. People born during Russia’s liberalization in the 1990s tend to be more entrepreneurial than their elders, rely less on the state and are more liberal on matters such as gay rights. In 2020 nearly 70% of older Russians told Levada Center, a polling group, that they could not survive without government help, while only 27% of those under 35 felt the same way. And in 2018, nearly 60% of young Russians told Levada that they have a positive view of the United States, despite the Kremlin’s propaganda.

“Putin and his crew understood that time was working against them, because the younger generation is not interested in their TV propaganda and does not believe that Russia is a fortress besieged by enemies, or that the United States wants to win,” says Mr. Sverdlin. This week Mr Navalny echoed that sentiment in a statement from his prison cell by his lawyers. Alexander Gabuev, who works for a think-tank in Moscow, was forced to quit last year, saying, “This is a war against Russia’s future … and regardless of the outcome of the war, Russia’s future will be very different now.” , which could have happened if it had not happened on 24 February.

Raving and Ravinger

For one thing, the 500,000 who have fled are among Russia’s best educated and most dynamic. He may not have played any role in politics before the war, but still his voice could be heard. not anymore. The political debate, to the extent that it is now in Russia, is not between those who oppose the war and those who support it, but between “patriots” and “turbo-patriots”, who are not cruel and aggressive to Russian commanders. Criticize being , The emergence of a chorus of wildly belligerent commentators has given rise to a rhetorical arms race in which all pundits and politicians who want to make a mark must stand up for their hot-headed bloodshed.

By amplifying pro-war voices while silencing common sense, Mr. Putin has achieved the illusion of total support for the war. People are probably wary of expressing criticism of it in any form, but even so, about 20% of Russians tell various polluters they are against it. It is reasonable to assume that anxiety is much more widespread than this. “Putin has managed to persuade the minority that he represents the majority, and the majority is the minority,” says Leonid Volkov, Mr. Navalny’s chief of staff.

Polling by Mr. Navalny’s team, which operates out of Russia, suggests that even among those who support the war, faith in Mr. Putin’s wisdom is fast eroding. Since the summer, the share of those who think “special military operations” are proceeding according to plan has dropped from 40% to about 15%. This is hardly surprising, given the rising death toll. In October 6% of Russians said they knew someone who had died in war; By January this figure had doubled. Two-thirds of Russians know someone who has been mobilized or is fighting in a war.

In a recent interview, Oscar Kuchera, an actor and television host, neatly captured the ideas about Ukraine that are typical for many Russians. They simultaneously displayed confusion about the war’s purpose, misgivings about its progress, and ardent support for Mr. Putin and “our boys” on the front line. The idea of ​​annexing Ukrainian territory is particularly perplexing to him: “Don’t we have enough of our own problems without feeding someone else’s?” He asked. But he insisted Mr Putin must have had good reasons for his land grab, even if a layman like him might not fully understand them. The notion that Mr. Putin could start a war with malicious or selfish motives is greeted with incredulity. “Do you think he’s crazy?” he asks his interviewer.

pocketbook patriot

The idea that things are under control is reinforced by the stability of the economy. On the surface, Moscow looks much as it did before the war. Some popular Western brands—McDonald’s, IKEA—have disappeared and some martial symbols have materialized. On Gogol Boulevard, a street gallery pays tribute to fallen “Russian heroes”. Almost everyone walks without stopping.

The economy contracted a little more than 2% last year, with losses from sanctions largely offset by gains in export earnings, thanks to higher oil and gas prices. They were worth about $230bn (10% of GDP), according to Re:Russia, a research network, which was offsetting the roughly $275bn of capital that fled the country. The government has been able to increase its spending by a quarter, injecting an additional 5.5 trillion rubles ($74bn) into the economy.

Monthly production in some import-dependent and consumer-oriented industries, such as cars and pharmaceuticals, was 50% lower by the end of 2022 than at the beginning. But there has naturally been a boom in arms manufacturing. A joint venture to make Ford cars in Tatarstan has closed, but a military drone factory is being set up in the same city in cooperation with Iran.

Low oil prices and sharply declining gas sales could result in a budget shortfall this year. In the long run, the exodus of skilled workers will hurt the economy. Since the start of the war, it is estimated that Russia has lost at least 100,000 IT specialists. But the bureaucracy has done a good job of adapting to the new circumstances, blunting the immediate impact of the brain drain and sanctions. “They see it as a discovery,” says Mikhail Komin, a political scientist who surveyed middle-level technocrats. “They feel themselves in demand just like in the army”.

uniform support

In fact, the war has further aggravated the status of technocrats and the army and security services. The government wants to increase the army from its current 1 million soldiers to 1.5 million. This is 4% of the male, working-age population, a higher share than in any other country except North Korea. One third of the national budget goes to the men in uniform. Expenditure on the armed forces this year has been revised up to 40% compared to pre-war plans. Spending on domestic security – ie Mr. Putin’s repressive machinery – has increased by 50%. Meanwhile, spending on health care declined by 9%. The government also proposes to underline the rising status of men in uniform by pledging to set aside seats in the Duma, Russia’s already humble parliament, for “military patriots”. It,” says Natalia Zubarevich, an academic.

Culture and education have also been “mobilised”. Actors and artists who speak out against the war have been expelled from state-funded theatres, and the names of patriotic playwrights have been removed from playbills, even though their works continue to be performed. The latest victim is Lia Akhedzhakova, a famous Russian actress who has been ousted after 45 years on the stage of the Sovremennik Theater. Zelfira Tregulova, director of the Tretyakov Gallery, which houses the largest collection of Russian art, was dismissed for deviating from it. The Kremlin’s “spiritual and moral value” came after a visitor complained that the gallery’s contemporary work made him feel “pessimistic”. In her place is the daughter of a senior officer in the security services.

In short, even though the war has little material impact on most parts of Russia, conflict is inevitable. Re:Russia founder Kirill Rogov says, “Putin’s objective in this war is to achieve a radical break with the West and thereby maintain control of Russian society in a state of permanent conflict and mobilization.” Reverse gear for Putin,” says a former senior official. Any lack of progress on the battlefield is likely to be offset by ever-increasing repression and purges, especially as success becomes more elusive and casualties mount. Security services number 2.5m, more than twice the size of the armed forces.

Russians who looked to Europe for modernization are cut off, as Stalin tightened his grip in the 1920s. Some have turned to China instead. Mr. Putin and many of his opponents of the war see a Ukrainian victory as the best hope for Russia. Sverdlin, who runs a homeless charity in St Petersburg, is now trying to oppose Putin from outside the country. His new volunteer group helps desert and escape Russian soldiers, who often cross Russia’s borders illegally. Since autumn, his organization has helped 4,000 soldiers escape. “For me, and for many volunteers, this isn’t charity, it’s our way of striking back.” Few people are as interested in the victory of Ukraine as the Russians who want their country to be peaceful, free and prosperous. But for Ukraine to feel secure, Russia would need to change fundamentally. The way the war began in Russia, it may end there as well.

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