In Criminal case against actor Suriya and director TJ Gyanveli dismissedThe Madras High Court has spared him the ordeal of facing excruciating proceedings for allegedly insulting a section of the society in the acclaimed film Jai Bheem. The FIR has cited section 295A of the IPC, a provision for “deliberate and malicious acts with intent to outrage religious feelings” on the basis of a complaint that the film has insulted the Vanniyar community. A magistrate had sent the complaint to the police to register an FIR and concluded that it disclosed a “cognizable offence”. The High Court has rightly concluded that the magistrate had acted mechanically as the order did not even mention what offense was committed in the complaint. In this case, it is quite strange that the alleged insult to a caste was seen as inciting “religious” sentiments. It refers to the informal way in which caste and religion can be mixed with each other, claiming to be hurt or humiliated by others. The court has noted that barring the contention that the film was made in a manner likely to incite violence and enmity towards a particular community, no specific precedent was mentioned in the FIR.
The casual recourse to criminal prosecution for alleged insult to religion or any other social class has become an unfortunate feature of contemporary life. A few years back, the Supreme Court had to intervene to quash a criminal complaint against cricket star Mahendra Singh Dhoni for his likeness of a deity on the cover of a magazine. Section 295A has been interpreted by a Constitution Bench in 1957 to mean that it only “punishes the gravest form of insult to religion” when something is done intentionally and with malicious intent to hurt the religious sentiments of any class. Is. However, in practice, groups and individuals use some hypothetical minorities for themselves under the pretext of infringing on the right to freedom of speech and expression by objecting to films, plays and public performances. In many cases, the police tend to overestimate such complaints over their merit and cite the possibility of law and order disruption to prevent screening or demonstrations rather than protect freedom of expression. Constitutional courts have repeatedly intervened to protect freedom of expression, but often such relief is delayed. Books have been intertwined and demonstrations and lectures have been canceled more than necessary on the basis of threats and complaints. These developments can only mean that the fight for freedom of expression has to be fought afresh from time to time.