The sail that Indian diplomacy, state art needs

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosts five leaders from Central Asia at the Republic Day parade on January 26, it will give a strong indication of the new prominence of the Central Asian region in India’s security count. In 2015, Mr. Modi visited all five Central Asian states. Recently, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar also hosted their Central Asian counterparts in Delhi. The decline of US military power in Afghanistan, the subsequent takeover of Kabul by the Taliban and the consequent increase in the influence of Pakistan and China are of high concern to India’s continental security interests.

While the Republic Day invitation is symbolically significant, however, hard work lies ahead. India’s continental strategy, of which the Central Asian region is an essential link, has progressed intermittently over the past two decades – promoting connectivity, promoting defense and security cooperation, increasing India’s soft power and promoting trade and investment. to promote. This is laudable, but as it is now clear, it is insufficient to address the wider geopolitical challenges that prevail in the region.

focus on eurasia

The outspoken rise of China, the rapid withdrawal of United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces from Afghanistan, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces, the changing dynamics of Russia’s historical stabilization role (most recently in Kazakhstan) and related multilateral mechanisms The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union have all set the stage for intensifying geopolitical competition on the Eurasian landmass. The competition has been marked by the weaponization of resources and geographic access as a form of prevailing domination by China and other major powers. To meet this challenge, it will be a complex and long-term exercise for India to develop an effective continental strategy.

some course corrections

India’s maritime vision and ambitions have grown dramatically during the last decade, driven by its National Maritime Strategy, the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative for the Indian Ocean region and major concerns relating to the Indo-Pacific and Quad. It is a symbol of initiative. In which maritime security is primarily involved. This was perhaps an overdue correction for India’s historical disregard for maritime power. It was also a reaction to the dramatic rise of China as a military power. It may also be a by-product of the greater influence of Anglo-Saxon strategic thinking on our think-tank community, which has placed greater emphasis than others on the maritime dimensions of China’s military growth.

The US is even more so a major naval power in the Indo-Pacific, and defines its strategic priorities in the light of its own strengths. That said, maritime security is vital to keeping trade, commerce and shipping open to freedom, to help resist Chinese territorial growth in the South China Sea and elsewhere, and to counter Chinese intimidation tactics in interstate relations. Maritime security is important. However, maritime security and the associated dimensions of naval power are not sufficient instruments of state-craft as India seeks diplomatic and security construction to strengthen resistance against Chinese unilateral actions and the emergence of unipolar Asia.

The Chinese willingness and capacity for military intervention and power projection extend far beyond its immediate territory. Its rise is not only in the maritime sector. It is expanding on the Eurasian continent – ​​its Belt and Road Initiative projects in Central Asia to Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, reducing traditional Russian influence, gaining access to energy and other natural resources, and Dependency-generating investment, cyber and digital penetration and expanding influence among political and economic elites across the continent. The US military footprint has shrunk dramatically over the main Eurasian landmass, although it has a substantial military presence on the continental periphery. It is relatively easy to build a dam against China’s maritime expansionist advantage and reverse its advantage compared to the long-term strategic advantage that China hopes to secure over continental Eurasia. Just as the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is key to the Indo-Pacific, the centrality of Central Asian states should be important to Eurasia.

limitation, connectivity issues

The partition of India and the threat of two successive fronts from Pakistan and China over the past six decades set the stage for a difficult continental dimension of our security. As the militarization of borders with Pakistan and China has increased, the Ladakh sector is now increasingly looking like it will see a permanent deployment on the Siachen Glacier. India has been under land embargo by Pakistan for more than five decades, with some parallels in relations between two states that are not technically at war. Connectivity makes no sense when access is denied through persistent neighboring state hostilities contrary to the principles of international law.

America’s hostile attitude towards Iran has caused difficulties in operating an alternative route – the International North-South Transport Corridor. It may seem strange that when we join the US and others in supporting the right to freedom of navigation in the maritime domain, we are with the same force as India’s rights to interstate trade, commerce and transit along continental routes. Do not demand – be it through the removal of Pakistan’s blockade on transit or the lifting of US sanctions against transit into Eurasia via Iran. With recent Afghan developments, India’s physical connectivity challenges with Eurasia have become even more serious. India’s marginalization on the Eurasian continent in terms of connectivity must be reversed.

where America stands

U.S.-Russia confrontations concerning Ukraine following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, Russian opposition to future NATO expansion, and broader questions of European security, including the issue of new deployments of intermediate-range missiles. There would be dire consequences for Eurasian security. It comes against the backdrop of an ongoing US review of its global military commitments. While the US had over 2,65,000 troops under European command in 1992, it now has about 65,000. Even with the rise of China’s military power over the past decade, the US, which had about 100,000 troops in the early 1990s, now called the Indo-Pacific Command, currently has around There are 90,000 soldiers who are mostly committed to regional defence. Japan and South Korea. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) has undergone a major transformation during the last decade; It had about 170,000 soldiers a decade ago (related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), but now has less than 10,000 personnel.

The bottom line is that the US will be seriously pulled if it wants to simultaneously increase its force levels in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The successive waves of post-Cold War NATO expansion only increased overall insecurity, which had the potential to make the US the mother of all crises. A major conflict – if it breaks out in central Europe, pitting Russia, Ukraine and some European states – would stifle any hope of a substantial US military pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Geopolitics may be fragmented but always connects globally. Russia and China do not need to be coalition partners to allow coordinated actions involving Taiwan or the Donbass, as such coordination would stem from the logic of the strategic puzzle in which the US now finds itself. In the same vein, European NATO powers can only rely on the US to strengthen security in the Indo-Pacific. Their engagement with the Indo-Pacific is welcome, but we should be aware not only of geography’s limitations, the clear gap between strategic ambition and capability, but also of how major maritime powers view critical questions of continental security Of course, there are different approaches to this. India is unique in that no other peer nation has the gravity of the challenges on both continental and maritime dimensions.

be vocal about rights

Going forward, it is clear that India will not have the luxury of choosing one over the other; We will need to acquire a strategic vision and deploy the necessary resources to advance our continental interests without neglecting our interests in the maritime domain. This will require a more assertive push for our continental rights – namely transit and access, working with our partners in Central Asia, with Iran and Russia (not that we have many other options), and economic and more active engagement with security agendas ranging from the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Stabilizing Afghanistan is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Finding the right balance between continental and maritime security will be the best guarantor of our long-term security interests. But it will not be easy as we will have to work with different partners on different agendas, even if their geopolitical contradictions are out in the open. India will need to define its own standards of continental and maritime security in line with its interests. In doing so, in times of major geopolitical change, retaining our capacity for independent thought and action (namely strategic autonomy) will help our diplomacy and state craft navigate the difficult landscape and waters ahead. .

DB Venkatesh Verma is former Ambassador to Russia