‘There is no indication that the Indian Navy considers the P-75I impractical’ | Photo credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto
Speculation is rife that the Indian Navy may scrap Project-75I for submarine production and instead acquire more Scorpene (Kalvari-class) submarines – the fifth submarine of the class, INS VagirWas Joined the Navy on 23 January, a media report claimed last week that the IN faced a single seller The option in Project-75I—with a South Korean company as the sole bidder with a proven fuel cell air-independent propulsion (AIP) system—could place a repeat order for the construction of Scorpene-class submarines at Mazagon Dock Ltd. Is. As per the report, the Navy plans to install the Defense Research and Development Organisation’s yet-to-be-developed AIPs on the new submarines, which are in no small measure an advancement of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean.
There are many things wrong in the report. First, it is based almost entirely on conjecture, seemingly to render Project 75I impractical and “unviable”. There is no indication that the Navy considers the P-75I impractical. In December 2022, when Navy Chief Admiral Hari Kumar mentioned that a follow-on project for submarines would be Has agreed to By 2023, there were no signs of the Navy’s lack of confidence in the P-75I. while the navy has issuesMany design partners withdrew their tenders for various reasons (unrealistic design delivery schedules, impractical liability clauses, and harsh technology transfer requirements), there has never been a sense of doom about the project. In fact, German shipbuilder TKMS, which had earlier withdrawn its bid, has also indicated Desire To remain in the fray, provided the Indian Navy lives up to its expectations.
need to wait and see
The most difficult of the IN conditions for foreign partners is the requirement that the AIP be a proven system. As stated earlier, except for the South Korean firm Daewoo, none of the vendors bidding for the P-75I have proven AIP systems. The irony is that DRDO’s AIP itself is unproven. Back in March 2021, DRDO tested a land based prototype of AIP but reportedly little progress has been made since then. DRDO’s expectation of AIP being installed on the first Kalvari-class submarine when it comes under repair in 2024 is unrealistic as it is yet to be tested in field conditions. The Navy is reportedly in the process of designating a Kilo-class submarine as the “test bedFor the indigenous AIP, however, the process of installation and testing at sea is likely to be lengthy.
This does not mean that the DRDO AIP is unsuitable for installation in Kalvari-class submarines; It may prove its worth in the years to come. Nevertheless, the Navy would be ill-advised to base decisions on future submarines on the presumption of the success of the DRDO AIP. If experience is any guide, DRDO’s tall claims about technology development should be taken with a grain of salt. Specifically, the claim that the DRDO AIP prototype ran for 14 days endurance test Be aware of the fact that the tests were conducted in simulated underwater conditions. Under these circumstances, a wait-and-see approach is the best course of action for the Navy.
Second, the argument that canceling the P-75I and re-ordering the Project-75 submarines will advance ‘self-reliant India’ is wrong. The Navy leadership has admitted in the past that Naval Group, the French company that built the Scorpene-class submarines, had transferred inadequate technology during Project 75. There is a right argument to be made that future projects should be leveraged – the skills gained should be used in a domestic project like the P-75I, where the foreign collaborator would be contractually bound to transfer technology that would be needed to outsource Indian shipbuilders. Will enable us to build future submarines without help. Duplicating the Scorpene-class submarines at the altar of the P-75I would mean abandonment of the strategic partnership model. This is bound to have an adverse effect on the indigenization initiative of the Indian Navy. It will also be a blow to the confidence of private shipbuilders who have invested considerable fiscal and human capital develop abilities To build warships and submarines in the hope of contributing to the building up of the defense industrial base.
battery technology issue
Third, the claim that lithium-ion batteries are better than AIP – as suggested by media reports last week – is flawed. Lithium batteries, while offering improved efficiency, power, and charge and discharge mobility, are volatile and prone to thermal runaway, fire, and explosion risks. Despite the use of lithium batteries in Japan’s new submarines, lithium-ion fuel cell technology has still not reached a stage of maturity for the Indian Navy to consider it reliable.
There is also a big question whether DRDO’s phosphoric acid fuel cell based AIP is suitable for Indian submarines or not. The issue is not as clear cut as many imagine. PAFC Technology Certainly more rugged than other fuel cell types and provides longer life and efficiency. But PAFC is expensive, complex and difficult to maintain. Its platinum-coated electrodes experience rapid corrosion, and the carbon monoxide produced during the chemical process is known to reduce the overall performance of the system. For this reason, PAFCs are not used for submarine propulsion by any navy in the world. The success of the system so far has only been proven In stationary power generation systems. The only fuel cell technology known to work is the Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) used in German and South Korean submarines.
This is not meant to cast aspersions on India’s defense scientists and their efforts to find a solution to the AIP problem in conventional submarines. His effort is really commendable. The purpose of this account is simply to point out that speculation in the media that Project 75I is unsuitable for the Navy is deliberate misinformation intended to influence the defense decision-making process. So far there has been no indication that the Navy is going to – or in fact – abandon the P-75I.
Abhijit Singh is the head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation and a former naval officer.