Ankara may soon realize that domestic divisions and economic fragility will determine its regional influence
In the former Ottoman territory, today there is a Turkish presence – diplomatic, economic and even military – in the form of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoan, rewiring its modern nation with the impression of its earlier Islamic and military glory. want to shape. The Turkish army has made deep inroads into Iraq and Syria. Turkish officials are advising the Islamist group in Libya and supporting it with mercenaries from the Syrian militia. Turkey’s navy has become an aggressive presence in the eastern Mediterranean and is claiming control of gas reserves claimed by Greece and Cyprus.
military, diplomatic
Turkey is also a military player in the South Caucasus; Last year, it backed Azerbaijan against its arch-rival, Armenia, and won a victory for its protégé that gave it a substantial portion of the territory it claimed from its neighbour. And, as the modern sultan professes the Islamic heritage of the Ottomans, he has until recently faced opponents of political Islam in the region – Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
These strong initiatives have raised concerns among regional players – the Ottomans’ traditional rivals, Iran and Russia, and the contemporary superpower, the United States. With them, Turkey engages in complex confrontation, which is in turn confrontationist and accommodative, providing tension and uncertainty to these important relations.
Turkey’s military efforts in Syria and Iraq have a contemporary urgency – the Kurds’ aspiration for autonomy, if not independence.
In Iraq, Turkey regularly pounds Turkish Kurds, who have taken refuge in the Iraqi mountains with its air force, and carries out targeted killings of local commanders with its deadly drones. In Syria, the proximity of areas under Kurdish control has been broken by three Turkish military incursions since 2016 and most of the Syrian-Turkish border is now under Turkish control.
Turkey is also involved in a complicated chariot in Idlib, the last stronghold in Syria, in rebel hands. Here, he is trying to merge Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al Qaeda-linked Jabhat Nusra, into the Syrian National Army, a coalition of rebel forces. Turkey believes that, with the formidable HTS on its side, it will be able to amalgamate Kurdish aspirations in northern Syria with local militias.
Beyond West Asia, two hotspots have emerged – again in the old Turkic region. After gaining control of the Nakhchivan enclave in the west of Armenia, Azerbaijan now sought control over the route, called the Zangezur Corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan to the enclave. This corridor, if accepted, would cut Iran’s direct links with Armenia, which is Iran’s only land route to the North Caucasus, while bypassing Iran to Turkey as a link to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. Provides direct route.
The issue has divided the region – Turkey itself, has put together a trilateral security alliance of Georgia and Azerbaijan, while Iran has reaffirmed its ties with Armenia and conducted military exercises along the Azerbaijan border.
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Again, Turkey is highlighting its ties with Georgia and Ukraine, rejecting Russia’s “illegal occupation” of Crimea and providing military drones to Ukraine. Since June this year, it has begun construction of “Canal Istanbul”, a new link from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, raising concerns in Russia that Turkey will someday allow free movement between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. may prohibit.
In the Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus have been at the center of France’s access to Africa. This is now challenged by Turkey’s strong access to African countries and its plans to gain a naval presence off the Libyan coast and in the Red Sea. Now, following the AUKUS humiliation – a tripartite security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States – France has struck a new defense agreement with Greece to upgrade the Greek navy to challenge Turkey in the Mediterranean; It is also supplying fighter jets to the Air Force, but the deal was first signed in January 2021.
Turkey vs America, Russia
Both Russia and the US view Turkey’s regional intrigues with serious concern. Turkey is concerned by US support for the Syrian Kurds and doubts a possible role of the US in a July 2016 coup attempt to overthrow Mr. In violation of its status as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 missile defense system in 2017. The US then expelled Turkey from the development of the US F-35 jet fighter project and imposed some sanctions.
While Mr. Erdoan’s personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has flourished, there has been a regular decline as well. Turkey and Russia are on opposite sides in the Syria, Libya, Ukraine and Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, but have somehow ensured that these differences do not reach breaking point. Mr Putin has prioritized the withdrawal of Turkey from NATO and has exercised “strategic patience” in dealing with the prickly Turkish leader.
Recently, in an effort to arm himself with US President Joe Biden, Mr. Erdoan has unexpectedly asked the US to supply 40 F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernization kits for its existing aircraft. But observers believe it could be Mr Erdoan’s “final test of faith” for the Biden administration. Knowing full well the hostilities directed by Turkey in the US Congress, the expected rejection of this request would enable Mr. Erdoan to irrevocably transfer to Russia – Mr. Putin’s already Fifth-generation Sukhoi SU – in place of the F. 57 aircraft have been promised. -35 jet and also a second battery of the S-400 defense system.
resetting relationships
As the US continues to break away from the region, West Asia is in turmoil. Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose rivalry has defined regional politics for more than a decade, are now talking about re-establishing diplomatic ties and addressing their bilateral and regional concerns.
Turkey has approached both Egypt and Saudi Arabia to improve their relations; The latter are turning back to see evidence of real change on the part of Turkey – particularly with regard to support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey has also indicated a new approach in Libya that will accommodate its rivals – Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia. Here, Turkey’s priority is to isolate Egypt from its ties with Greece, Cyprus and Israel, and to make it its ally in the ongoing competition in the Mediterranean.
With Iran, Turkey is following a double path – facing it in the Caucasus, while building substantial bilateral energy and economic ties. It is also keeping the option of closer strategic ties open if Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain indifferent to Turkey’s proposals.
The outlook for Turkey’s relations with the major powers – the US and Russia – remains uncertain. Turkey asserts its strategic autonomy and freedom of action, and enjoys sitting at the global high table, with its counsel being respectfully requested by both powers – as it was in the heyday of the Ottoman Empire.
But Turkey soon learned that the era of the sultans was over and that its domestic divisions and economic fragility – unemployment, inflation, currency collapse and capital flight – would ultimately determine its regional influence. And here, it will be found seriously desired – as were the Ottomans in the late 19th century.
Talmiz Ahmed is a former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, and holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune.
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