sSince 2004, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), has been responsible for guarding the Sino-India border, under the principle of ‘one border one force’. The military is responsible for guarding the volatile border where China’s saluting has been the norm, despite various border agreements since 1993. Consequently, the command and control of the ITBP has been a contentious issue between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). home Ministry.
on 15th August, The Economic Times Citing “official sources” report good That the Narendra Modi government is examining a proposal to give a major role to the ITBP along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to avoid a future confrontation between the Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China. According to the report, it also plans to establish a formal communication channel between China’s Border Defense Regiment and the ITBP, which till now is controlled by the military.
What does “a major or more active role” mean? Is the ITBP being reorganized to act as a first line of defense and logistically under the Northern and Eastern Theater Commands? Or is there a potential for a diplomatic breakthrough towards a demarcated border to be guarded by the ITBP such as the Border Security Force/Sashastra Seema Bal/Assam Rifles on fixed borders?
unstable China-India border
Inhabited borders should be managed/protected to regulate genuine inter-state travel and commerce and to prevent illegal movement/immigration and smuggling. Worldwide, police/paramilitary forces are responsible for border management. In addition to all these actions, unstable borders with or without formal demarcation must also be protected, as the adversary is constantly in search of territorial advantage and strategic advantage. Thus, on unstable borders, a security force has to surround itself with the armed forces and act as the first line of defence. It can be argued that the strength of the armed forces can be increased to perform both tasks on unstable borders. The cost, the need for a large number of troops, the high risk of escalation, and the terrain configuration of the Lines of Control rule out this option.
Currently, with regard to the volatile India-China border, the Armed Forces and ITBP operate independently in virtual silos under the MoD and MHA. There is a remarkable resistance to the lateral flow of information and coordination. All functional aspects including logistics are copied. Not only this, the ITBP has not been placed under the command of the army even during the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ladakh. Despite the formation of about four divisions of the army, 35 border posts (BOPs) in eastern Ladakh remained in their original border management posture in stand-alone mode.
ITBP is a 60 year old professional force well adapted to work in high altitude areas. However, its structure, organization and equipment are not up to the mark to effectively function as a first line of defence. The lack of cooperation and coordination only adds to the problem. The ITBP should be reorganized on the lines of modern infantry battalions and placed under the command of the Army for all purposes. Border management is not a major issue on the China-India border. This can be looked after by the Ministry of Defence/Army.
At present, ITBP has 63 battalions with 180 BOPs. Forty seven additional BOPs are being set up. On our volatile borders both along the LAC and along the LoC, it has been the experience that adversaries occupy already untouched areas. The same thing happened in Kargil and Eastern Ladakh. Similar actions on smaller scale are reported from Arunachal Pradesh from time to time. Consequently, there is a need to link the 3,488-km long India-China border with the BOP. I think the strength of ITBP has to be doubled. This should be done away with in Chhattisgarh from all other duties like anti-insurgency operations, VIP security, and security of weak points.
guarding inhabited borders
With borders demarcated with friendly countries, the armed forces have little role to play, and border security/management forces must operate under the MHA. However, when the potential for conflict with Pakistan is high, the Border Security Force needs to be an integral part of national security under the armed forces during active hostilities.
A major diplomatic breakthrough with China could lead to the delimitation/demarcation of the LAC. It does not mean any resolution of the border dispute. The varying degrees of conflict will likely remain high as has been experienced so far. Tension will remain on the India-China border from the point of view of security.
what the government should understand
We have lakhs of Central Armed Police Forces. Of these, 50 lakh personnel from BSF, ITBP, SSB and Assam Rifles organized into 374 battalions have been deployed in border security/management roles. The Coast Guard does the same thing on our coast.
Our massive Border Security Force is a national security asset. In conflict/war, it should work in a seamless and cohesive manner with the armed forces. It should be organised, equipped and trained to perform its dual role. With unstable borders, it must function under the armed forces, and with fixed boundaries, it must come under their command in combat. Its operational employment in combat is a factor of equipment, training and ethos and can vary from conventional operations to guerrilla warfare.
Deployment of Border Security Forces under the command of Army in conflict/war is already codified in the Union War Book, but due to their structure, organisation, equipment and vague command/control the coordination is not up to the desired standards. There is an urgent need for holistic reforms. It will be a pity if this valuable asset is not used optimally for national security.
Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM (R), served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. He tweets @ rwac48. Thoughts are personal.
(Edited by Likes)